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Young Ran (Christine) Kim* 
Since COVID-19 has forced many governments to restrict travel and 
impose quarantine requirements, telework has become a way of life. The 
shift towards teleworking is raising tax concerns for workers who work for 
employers located in another state than where they live. Most source states 
where these employers are located could not have taxed income of out-of-
state teleworkers under the pre-pandemic tax rules. However, several 
source states have unilaterally extended their sourcing rule on these 
teleworkers, resulting in unwarranted risk of double taxation — once by 
the residence state and again by the source state. At this time, there is no 
uniform guideline by state or federal governments.  
Recently, New Hampshire, supported by fourteen other states, asked the 
U.S. Supreme Court to exercise its original jurisdiction challenging 
Massachusetts’ telecommuting taxes of nonresident teleworkers. Tax 
commentators believed this case would be one of the most significant tax 
decisions in recent years, but the Supreme Court declined to hear it. New 
Jersey also opposes New York’s long-standing telecommuting taxes under 
the “convenience of the employer” rule. This Article examines the 
constitutional challenges of maintaining pre-pandemic work arrangements 
for tax purposes, arguing that a source state’s extraterritorial assertion to 
tax nonresident teleworkers’ income likely violates the Dormant Commerce 
and Due Process Clauses. Also, this Article finds the Supreme Court’s 
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decision not to exercise original jurisdiction dissatisfying in light of the 
substantial increase in remote work. 
The problem of taxing teleworkers is not temporary because the pandemic 
drastically reshaped where and how people work. Recognizing the need for 
a uniform long-term solution, this Article argues Congress should enact 
federal law to preempt conflicting state law positions and enforce the 
primacy of residence-based taxation on teleworkers’ income. This proposal 
would reduce the impact various source states’ tax laws have on interstate 
commerce, preserve due process, and bolster policy rationales, such as 
taxpayers’ choice in where they reside and pay taxes as their social 
obligation to the community. 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
INTRODUCTION ................................................................................. 1151 
 I. RULES FOR TAXING TELEWORKERS ......................................... 1160 
A. State Income Tax Rules .................................................... 1161 
1. Determining Residence ............................................ 1161 
2. Residence v. Source Taxation ................................... 1162 
B. Teleworkers ..................................................................... 1164 
1. Distinguishing Teleworkers from Mobile Workers . 1164 
2. The Risk of Double Taxation of Teleworkers .......... 1165 
C. Guidance During COVID-19 ........................................... 1167 
1. The States’ Responses ............................................... 1167 
2. A Most Troubling Response ..................................... 1170 
 II. THE BATTLE OVER TAXING TELEWORKERS .............................. 1171 
A. New Hampshire v. Massachusetts ................................. 1172 
1. Arguments Supporting Residence States .................. 1173 
a. Commerce Clause ................................................ 1173 
i. Substantial Nexus ........................................ 1174 
ii. Fair Apportionment ..................................... 1175 
iii. Nondiscrimination ....................................... 1175 
iv. Fair Relationship to Services Provided by 
the State ....................................................... 1176 
b. Due Process Clause .............................................. 1176 
2. Arguments Supporting Source States ....................... 1177 
3. Original Jurisdiction and Standing........................... 1178 
a. Original Jurisdiction ............................................ 1179 
b. Standing .............................................................. 1183 
4. Constitutional Challenges in Maintaining 
Pre-COVID Work Arrangements for Tax Purposes . 1185 
B. Old Battles Against New York ......................................... 1195 
1. New York’s “Convenience of the Employer” Rule ... 1195 
  
2021] Taxing Teleworkers 1151 
2. Extension to Teleworkers......................................... 1196 
3. Zelinsky ..................................................................... 1198 
4. New Jersey’s Attack Amid COVID-19 ...................... 1200 
 III. IN SUPPORT OF RESIDENCE-BASED TAXATION FOR 
TELEWORKERS ........................................................................ 1201 
A. Are Pre-COVID Arrangements Still the Status Quo? ........ 1202 
1. Teleworking Is No Longer Temporary..................... 1203 
2. The Unpersuasive Extension .................................... 1206 
B. A Solution for the Future ................................................. 1207 
1. People as Physical Being in the Digital Economy .... 1207 
2. Teleworkers and the Modern Tiebout Model .......... 1210 
C. Tax Nexus Theories Support Residence-Based Taxation 
for Teleworkers ............................................................... 1212 
1. Consent Theory: Vote with Your Feet ..................... 1213 
2. Benefits Theory ......................................................... 1215 
3. Social Obligation Theory .......................................... 1217 
 IV. FEDERALISM AND A CONGRESSIONAL SOLUTION ..................... 1218 
A. A Congressional Solution for the Interstate Commerce 
Tax Problem .................................................................... 1218 
B. Federal Preemption and the States Powers to Tax ............ 1221 
CONCLUSION..................................................................................... 1225 
INTRODUCTION 
Sam is an associate attorney at a law firm in Boston, Massachusetts. 
Sam lives in New Hampshire and, pre-COVID-19, Sam would commute 
to her office in Boston. Since COVID-19 swept the country in early 
2020, Sam has been working remotely from her home. When stay-at-
home orders were issued by the Governors of Massachusetts and New 
Hampshire in March of 2020,1 Sam no longer had the option to 
commute to her office in Boston but was forced to work from home. 
Over time, the shutdown orders have operated like a light switch, on 
and off again. Sam chose the stability of working from home with 
permission from her law firm; while working from home, Sam relied on 
New Hampshire’s infrastructure, including its electricity, internet, 
access to local stores through roadways, and other services. When Sam 
 
 1 COVID-19 State of Emergency, MASS.GOV, https://www.mass.gov/info-
details/covid-19-state-of-emergency (last visited Sept. 10, 2021) [https://perma.cc/ 
FCQ7-2TZ3]; U.S. Dep’t of State, Notice, New Hampshire “Stay Home” Order (Mar. 29, 
2020), www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/2020-03-29-Notice-New-Hampshire-
Stay-Home-Order.pdf [https://perma.cc/74CJ-9RXE].  
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tested positive for COVID-19 in September 2020, she also depended on 
New Hampshire’s ambulance and hospital services.  
Now Sam is preparing to file her state tax returns for 2020. Because 
she lives in New Hampshire and worked in Massachusetts, both New 
Hampshire and Massachusetts can exercise a taxing right over Sam — 
the former under residence state taxation, and the latter under source 
state taxation. Generally, residence states, like New Hampshire, exercise 
the power to tax the personal income of their residents regardless of 
where the income is sourced.2 In contrast, source states, like 
Massachusetts, impose taxes on nonresidents’ income only for the work 
they performed while physically within the source states.3 If a person 
earns income from working remotely for a firm in the source state, such 
income may only be taxed by the residence state. When an individual is 
subject to both resident and source taxation, their income is taxed 
twice, also known as double taxation, pitting residence and source 
taxation against each other (unless tax credits are offered by the 
residence state).  
Of the competing taxing rights, which state ought to have the priority 
over teleworkers’ incomes? In this example, Sam is a resident of New 
Hampshire, worked entirely from her home for more than nine months, 
and used public services, “including police and medical services, 
taxpayer-supported broadband internet, utilities, roads, and more,”4 
offered by New Hampshire. Thus, under the general rule explained 
above, New Hampshire, the residence state, should have the priority. 
Nevertheless, Massachusetts, the source state, taxes Sam’s salary and has 
priority over New Hampshire because it adopted a temporary 
emergency regulation declaring that nonresident income received for 
services performed outside Massachusetts would still be subject to 
Massachusetts’ income tax.  
Here, Sam is subject to the risk of double taxation — once by the 
residence state, and then a second time by the source state. The latter 
 
 2 See WALTER HELLERSTEIN, KIRK J. STARK, JOHN A. SWAIN & JOAN M. YOUNGMAN, 
STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 379 (11th ed. 2020); John A. Swain 
& Walter Hellerstein, State Jurisdiction to Tax “Nowhere” Activity, 33 VA. TAX REV. 209, 
212, 221 (2013). 
 3 See Ruth Mason, Tax Expenditures and Global Labor Mobility, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
1540, 1554 (2009). There is an important exception to this rule, called the “convenience 
of the employer” rule, adopted by New York, Arkansas, Connecticut, Delaware, 
Nebraska, and Pennsylvania, which will be discussed infra Parts I.B.2, II.B. 
 4 Motion for Leave to File Bill of Complaint at 19, New Hampshire v. 




2021] Taxing Teleworkers 1153 
tax would not apply to Sam if she did not earn interstate income from 
her remote work. Further, another issue arises if the residence state 
offers credits for taxes paid by its residents to other states5 because this 
means the residence state foregoes collecting taxes from its residents 
despite all the public services it has offered. The result of this double 
taxation is a reduction in revenue for the residence state.  
Note that Sam’s example would be more accurate by replacing New 
Hampshire with another state with a positive tax rate. New Hampshire 
may not be a good example to explain the risk of double taxation and 
the tax credit issue because New Hampshire has an individual income 
tax rate of zero.6 This unique feature also worked against New 
Hampshire in the Supreme Court’s decision in New Hampshire v. 
Massachusetts,7 discussed below. Having noted this problem, this Article 
offers Sam’s case by referring to the conflict between New Hampshire 
and Massachusetts as a stylized and intuitive example that shows the 
additional layer of taxation by source state that would not have been 
imposed on teleworkers on top of the residence taxation. A more 
thorough analysis is provided later in this Article.  
Now, consider Chris, who has a similar problem with a slightly 
different fact pattern. Chris is a software engineer for a technology 
company in California’s Silicon Valley. When the company allowed 
employees to work remotely beginning in February 2020 due to 
COVID-19, Chris moved out of his expensive apartment in the San 
Francisco Bay Area and relocated to Salt Lake City, Utah, where his 
parents live. Chris rented an apartment in Salt Lake City, changed his 
mailing and billing addresses to Utah, selected a local family doctor, and 
lived there for more than 183 days in 2020, which is a rule of thumb to 
determine Chris’s residence state.8 Does that mean that Utah becomes 
the residence state and California the source state, so that California can 
 
 5 All states with broad-based personal income taxes provide credit for taxes paid to 
other states to mitigate the double taxation issue. See Credit for Taxes Paid to Another 
State, 0130 REGSURVEYS 37 (2021).  
 6 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 77:4 (2020). Massachusetts has a minimum income tax 
rate of five percent. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 62, § 4 (2020).  
 7 New Hampshire v. Massachusetts, 141 S. Ct. 1262 (2021) (denying motion for 
leave to file a bill of complaint). Justices Thomas and Alito would have granted the 
motion. Id.  
 8 The 183-day rule means that if a person spends more than half of the year (183 
days) in a single state, then this person will become a tax resident of that state. However, 
each state may have various qualifiers to this rule. For example, for federal income tax 
purposes in international tax context, the Internal Revenue Code uses a more 
complicated formula, including a portion of days from the previous two years as well as 
the current year. See infra Part I.C.   
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collect tax on Chris’s income only for the days Chris physically worked 
in California?  
The answer is unclear because the definition of “resident” includes 
not only the 183-day rule but also other fuzzier factors, such as the place 
where a permanent home is located, the place that is the center of one’s 
life, the place where one’s car is registered, where one’s children go to 
school, and where one goes to see a family doctor.9 If a person relocates 
from one state to another state for a temporary or transitory purpose, 
the person may still be a resident of the former state.10 This would 
especially be the case if Chris did not change his driver’s license from 
California to Utah because of difficulties getting an appointment at the 
DMV due to social distancing rules.  
Hence, it is possible that California would insist that Chris’s 
relocation is merely temporary or transitory due to the COVID-19 
pandemic. Thus, California remains Chris’s residence state and can 
exercise its taxing right on the entire amount of Chris’s yearly income 
as the residence state. If Utah also argues that it is Chris’s residence state 
under the 183-day rule, Chris will be double taxed. This would not 
occur if Chris were not engaged in cross-border activities. Additionally, 
Utah would offer a tax credit for income taxes paid to California because 
California is the source state as well. Then, despite the public services 
provided to Chris for the majority of 2020, Utah would collect no tax 
from Chris because Utah’s income tax rate is lower than California’s.11 
In these circumstances, Chris might have to pay a higher tax rate than 
his parents who live down the street, even though they all live in Utah 
and receive the same public services from Utah. Here, both Utah and 
Chris bear a loss with California not paying for Utah’s services while 
also taking income from Chris.  
These two examples illustrate that the age of telecommuting has 
introduced new concerns to the tax concepts of source of income and 
residence of taxpayers. Sam’s example demonstrates the ambiguities as 
to what it means to earn income “in” a source state, because 
 
 9 See infra Part I.A.1. 
 10 HELLERSTEIN ET AL., supra note 2, at 379-80. A classic example would be college 
students, relocating temporarily for educational purposes.  
 11 Currently, Utah has a flat income tax rate of 4.95 percent while California has a 
top marginal individual income tax rate of 12.3 percent. UTAH CODE ANN. § 59-10-104 
(2020); Standard Deductions, Exemption Amounts, and Tax Rates for 2020 Tax Year, CAL. 
FRANCHISE TAX BD., https://www.ftb.ca.gov/about-ftb/newsroom/tax-news/november-
2020/standard-deductions-exemption-amounts-and-tax-rates-for-2020-tax-year.html 
[https://perma.cc/6RCG-F7FC]. California is a source state from Utah’s perspective, and 
thus Utah may have to offer tax credits for foreign state taxes on out-of-state source 
income. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 59-10-1003 (2021).  
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Massachusetts, potentially losing its source state status over 
nonresident Sam’s income, attempts to extend its source status. Chris’s 
example shows the confusion as to which state ought to be considered 
the residence state because California, which could have been switched 
from residence to source state, attempts to maintain the status of 
residence state.  
However, both examples share the same problem — that is, source 
states pursue extraterritorial taxing rights by arguing that the work and 
residence arrangements before the pandemic should remain the status 
quo. This pursuit renders taxpayers’ adjustments to their new work 
environments and residence as immaterial. Moreover, these states do 
this at the cost of residence states and cross-border taxpayers. This 
raises constitutional issues under the Dormant Commerce Clause12 and 
the Due Process Clause13 on whether the source state’s assertion of a 
taxing right imposes an undue burden on interstate commerce. It also 
raises theoretical questions regarding whether a state’s tax nexus on its 
constituents may justify the source state’s aggressive approach.  
Sam and Chris embraced their new telework arrangements because of 
COVID-19. But by all indications, shifts like Sam and Chris’s are not 
temporary, but part of a broader and more dramatic reshaping of the 
American workforce. However, as illustrated above, the COVID-19 
pandemic has influenced many governments to attempt to freeze reality 
to the pre-pandemic era by adopting “anti-catastrophe” tax law and 
regulatory guidance.14 Most issued guidance relies on methods of 
disregarding specific time-frames, considering pre-pandemic practices, 
or assessing public health directives and travel restrictions in addressing 
the tax consequences of remote workers.15 These temporary responses 
treat the changes brought on by the pandemic as force majeure and try 
to mold pandemic-era changes into the pre-pandemic status quo as if 
the pandemic is only temporary and has not accelerated the shift to a 
remote workforce and digital economy.16  
 
 12 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8; see infra Part II.A.4. 
 13 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; see infra Part II.A.1.b. 
 14 Andres Baez Moreno, Unnecessary and Yet Harmful: Some Critical Remarks to the 
OECD Note on the Impact of the COVID-19 Crisis on Tax Treaties, 48 INTERTAX: EUR. TAX 
REV. 814, 829 (2020). 
 15 See, e.g., OECD, UPDATED GUIDANCE ON TAX TREATIES AND THE IMPACT OF THE COVID-
19 PANDEMIC 3-6 (Jan. 21, 2021), https://www.oecd.org/coronavirus/policy-responses/ 
updated-guidance-on-tax-treaties-and-the-impact-of-the-covid-19-pandemic-df42be07/) 
[https://perma.cc/EQJ3-EQRX] (providing examples of COVID-19 guidance issued by 
various jurisdictions regarding the creation of permanent establishments by resident and the 
possible factors that affect such creation). 
 16 See id. at 9, 12. 
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In ignoring the new reality, residence states now bear heavier burdens 
to support their residents amid the COVID-19 pandemic, and yet those 
states cannot collect their fair share of tax. Holding to the status quo 
also disrupts many Americans who find themselves teleworking from 
home in one state for an employer in another state and, as a result, are 
now subject to the risk of double taxation.  
Problems concerning the taxation of income earned by teleworkers 
and dual residents are not novel.17 Over the past decade, Americans 
have steadily increased telecommuting and working from home.18 Even 
without the pandemic, these numbers would likely have continued 
increasing, eventually prompting a more precise government response 
to the changing workforce. But the pandemic has accelerated the time 
frame for needed change. Where before thirty-one percent of workers 
teleworked from home at least once a week, suddenly eighty-eight 
percent are now doing so.19 These problems will not disappear as the 
waves from the pandemic recede. Instead, these problems will remain 
even after travel disruptions and worker standardization caused by 
COVID-19 dissipates.20  
 
 17 Cf. Edward A. Zelinsky, Apportioning State Personal Income Taxes to Eliminate the 
Double Taxation of Dual Residents: Thoughts Provoked by the Proposed Minnesota 
Snowbird Tax, 15 FL. TAX REV. 533 (2014) (noting that dual residents also face similar 
questions of taxation with teleworkers). 
 18 Compare Census Bureau Report Shows Steady Increase in Home-Based Workers 
Since 1999, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Oct. 4, 2012), https://www.census.gov/newsroom/ 
releases/archives/employment_occupations/cb12-188.html [https://perma.cc/KJ5Z-5YGK], 
with Kimberly Mlitz, Remote Work Frequency Before and After COVID-19 in the United 
States 2020, STATISTA (Apr. 9, 2021), https://www.statista.com/statistics/1122987/change-in-
remote-work-trends-after-covid-in-usa/ [https://perma.cc/7LUQ-SVCE] (indicating an 
increase in remote work from seven percent to nine percent from 1999 to 2010 from 
the Census Bureau and comparing the two sources indicates an increase from nine 
percent in 2010 to seventeen percent, telecommuted five days or more per week, in 
2020 prior to COVID-19). 
 19 Michael J. Bologna, Employers Lean on Congress to Solve Work-From-Home Tax 
Dilemma, BLOOMBERG TAX (Aug. 25, 2020, 1:46 AM), https://news.bloombergtax.com/ 
daily-tax-report-state/employers-lean-on-congress-to-solve-work-from-home-tax-dilemma 
[https://perma.cc/5674-YD4U] (indicating that thirty-one percent of workers 
telecommuted, or worked from home, between one and five days each week). 
 20 See Mark Klein, Joseph Endres & Katherine Piazza, Tax Implications of COVID-
19 Telecommuting and Beyond, CPA J. (July 2021), https://www.cpajournal.com/ 
2021/07/16/tax-implications-of-covid-19-telecommuting-and-beyond/ [https://perma.cc/ 
56UX-WEVC] (indicating that “[g]iven the prolonged length of the pandemic and the 
adjustment to remote work for both employers and employees, remote work may very 
well become a regular part of business operating and hiring models for the foreseeable 
future . . .”); infra Part III.A.1. 
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New Hampshire’s request for the Supreme Court to exercise its 
original jurisdiction demonstrates the need to resolve the issue of taxing 
teleworkers.21 The challenge of New Hampshire22 lies at the intersection 
of Congress’ commerce powers and a state’s right to tax out-of-state 
workers. The core issue in New Hampshire revolves around 
Massachusetts’ announcement that the state was changing its tax policy 
for tax nonresidents who, prior to COVID-19, were employees engaged 
in business in Massachusetts and had stopped commuting to the 
commonwealth. Now Massachusetts will treat these nonresidents’ 
income as Massachusetts’ source income. In response, New Hampshire 
filed a Motion to Leave to File Bill of Complaint against Massachusetts, 
arguing that Massachusetts’ new rule violates the Dormant Commerce 
Clause as enunciated in Complete Auto23 and the Due Process Clause.24 
Massachusetts responded that its tax rule does not violate those clauses 
and challenged the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction over this case 
as well as New Hampshire’s standing.25  
Various other states — Ohio, Arkansas, Indiana, Kentucky, 
Louisiana, Missouri, Nebraska, Oklahoma, Texas, Utah, New Jersey, 
Connecticut, Hawaii, and Iowa — as well as organizations and 
individuals filed Amicus Briefs in support of New Hampshire 
concerning the motion or the merits.26 On January 25, 2021, the 
Supreme Court invited the Acting Solicitor General to file a brief 
expressing the views of the United States federal government in this rare 
 
 21 See New Hampshire v. Massachusetts, 141 S. Ct. 1262, 1262 (2021).  
 22 New Hampshire, 141 S. Ct. 1262. 
 23 Brief for Plaintiff, Motion For Leave to File Bill of Complaint at 25-30, New 
Hampshire, 141 S. Ct. 1262 (Oct. 19, 2020) (No. 22O154) [hereinafter Brief for 
Plaintiff]; see also Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977) 
(providing that courts will “[sustain] a tax against Commerce Clause challenge[s] when 
the tax is applied to an activity with a substantial nexus with the taxing State, is fairly 
apportioned, does not discriminate against interstate commerce, and is fairly related to 
the services provided by the State”).  
 24 Brief for Plaintiff, supra note 23, at 30-32. 
 25 See infra Part II.A. 
 26 To be clear, Ohio, Arkansas, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Missouri, Nebraska, 
Oklahoma, Texas, and Utah argue that the Supreme Court should be mandated to 
review this case. See Brief for States of Ohio et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting New 
Hampshire’s Motion for Leave To File Bill of Complaint at 1, New Hampshire, 141 S. Ct. 
1262 (Dec. 21, 2020) (No. 22O154) [hereinafter Amici Curiae Brief for States of Ohio 
et al.]. The other states argue that not only should the case be reviewed, but that the 
case should be decided in New Hampshire’s favor. See Brief for States of New Jersey et 
al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Plaintiff at 1-3, New Hampshire, 141 S. Ct. 1262 (Dec. 
22, 2020) (No. 22O154) [hereinafter Amici Curiae Brief for States of New Jersey et al.]. 
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original jurisdiction case.27 The Acting Solicitor General’s responded to 
this in the negative.28 On June 28, 2021, the Supreme Court declined to 
hear this case.29  
This Article offers the following contributions regarding this timely 
topic. First, by reviewing the arguments of both residence and source 
states, this Article contributes to the discussion by demonstrating the 
constitutional problems of maintaining pre-pandemic work 
arrangements as the status quo for tax purposes. This Article argues that 
Massachusetts’ tax rule emulates New York’s long-standing 
“convenience of the employer” rule that has been criticized as an 
unconstitutional extraterritorial assertion of taxing right of a source 
state. Both New Hampshire and New York’s rule raise the question of 
whether a state can tax a nonresident not performing services within 
the state but working for a company that resides in that state. This issue 
can be framed as one regarding residence versus source taxation and 
whether source taxation supersedes a residence state’s taxing power.  
This Article argues Massachusetts’ tax rule violates the Dormant 
Commerce Clause under the Complete Auto test30 as well as the Due 
Process Clause because (1) nonresident teleworkers’ activity lacks 
substantial nexus with Massachusetts, (2) the income is not fairly 
apportioned between source and residence states, (3) Massachusetts’ 
tax rule discriminates against multistate teleworkers and burdens 
interstate commerce, and (4) it taxes activities not fairly related to the 
services provided by Massachusetts.  
In addition, because the Supreme Court declined to hear this case as 
a matter of original jurisdiction, this Article reviews the relevant cases 
and jurisprudence of original jurisdiction and laments the Supreme 
Court’s decision in light of the substantial increase in remote work.31 
Second, in addition to the constitutional analysis, this Article presents 
more fundamental and theoretical problems of the extraterritorial 
assertion of the taxing right from source states.32 Such theoretical 
analysis may offer insights for the Court and policymakers where it is 
easy to digress from the real problem by being overwhelmed from the 
technical and doctrinal legal analysis of the facts and laws at issue.  
 
 27 See New Hampshire, 141 S. Ct. 1262 (mem.). 
 28 See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 1, New Hampshire, 141 S. Ct. 
1262 (May 25, 2021) (No. 154) [hereinafter Brief for the United States as Amicus 
Curiae]. 
 29 New Hampshire, 141 S. Ct. 1262 (mem.). 
 30 See infra Part II.A.1.a.  
 31 See infra Part II.A. 
 32 See infra Parts III.B–C. 
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Instead of governments viewing the rise of teleworkers as a temporary 
transition, states need to view this as an accelerated shift into a new era 
of teleworkers. This Article addresses the issues of maintaining the pre-
COVID status quo and encourages a shift to adapt to permanent 
changes.33 The importance of physical presence would be diminished 
for business entities, while still being important for individuals. This is 
perhaps even more meaningful in the digitalized economy where only 
natural persons can have physical presence.34 Additionally, the source 
states’ aggressive actions violate taxpayer agency and due process while 
burdening interstate commerce. Hence, this Article supports residence-
based taxation for nonresident teleworkers’ income. Establishing 
residence-based taxation could result in increased compliance and is 
supported by consent, benefit, and social obligation theories, which are 
foundational for any tax policy.35  
Third, this Article suggests a long-term solution for taxing 
teleworkers based on residence taxation.36 A state’s ability to implement 
its own tax policy is within its sovereign right. However, when a state 
implements source taxation on teleworkers, it can trigger additional 
concerns regarding the sovereignty of other states as seen in New 
Hampshire.37 Notably, Congress can create a lasting solution on the 
issue of multistate taxation. However, since Congress has not 
established a uniform tax policy, the courts have been left to navigate 
this murky area that Congress has failed to address. Congress has the 
ability and authority to enact legislation to provide a long-term solution 
to the current questions surrounding a state’s ability to tax teleworkers, 
and this Article presents various justifications for the use of federal 
preemption on this issue.38  
However, even before any legislative action, this Article rues that the 
Supreme Court decided not to hear New Hampshire. It is a rare original 
jurisdiction case with a third of states already involved. Many 
practitioners and scholars anticipated that New Hampshire would have 
been the most important tax case in recent years.39 The Supreme Court 
hearing this case would have accomplished two goals. First, the Court’s 
 
 33 See infra Part III. 
 34 See infra Part III.B. 
 35 See infra Parts III.B–C. 
 36 See infra Part IV.A. 
 37 See infra Part II.A. 
 38 See infra Part IV.B. 
 39 Matthew C. Boch, Open Weaver Banks, Lynn A. Gandhi & Dirk Giseburt, 
Remarks at the American Bar Association Tax Section Virtual 2021 Midyear Tax 
Meeting (Jan. 26, 2021). 
  
1160 University of California, Davis [Vol. 55:1149 
decision could clarify the quagmire of current Dormant Commerce 
Clause taxation doctrines by providing clear borders for states to 
operate within. Second, it would signal Congress to exercise its 
authority to regulate commerce between the states.  
While teleworking numbers may subside after the COVID-19 
pandemic, the teleworking revolution has begun. Work will continue 
to grow more remote and be conducted from one’s home. Without clear 
guidance, discriminatory double and over-taxation of interstate 
teleworkers will also continue to increase. Considering that the 
overarching problem involves interstate commerce and multistate 
taxation, the Article urges the federal government, Congress, and the 
Supreme Court to offer a solution. These efforts will shed light on 
another tax problem of teleworking — that is, the taxation of business 
entities with cross-border employees in multiple states. The analysis of 
this Article offers insights to a broader audience beyond teleworkers 
including those reviewing the potential state corporate tax competition 
on teleworking businesses.  
The remainder of this Article proceeds as follows. Part I overviews the 
rules governing the taxation of teleworkers, how states have taxed 
teleworkers, and how states have responded to the rise of teleworkers 
due to COVID-19 work-from-home orders. Part II discusses the battle 
between the residence states and the source states over taxing 
teleworkers’ income. This Part examines the constitutionality of 
Massachusetts’ new tax in New Hampshire and New York’s convenience 
of the employer rule under the Dormant Commerce Clause and Due 
Process Clause. Part III explores the recommendation and rationale for 
giving primacy to residence taxation over source taxation in the case of 
teleworkers and discusses social theories that align with resident 
taxation. Part IV presents Congress’s constitutional authority to create 
a uniform tax structure that preempts certain state nonresident taxing 
laws. The Article then concludes by emphasizing the need for judicial 
and legislative action.  
I. RULES FOR TAXING TELEWORKERS 
This Part reviews the basic rules already at play for taxing teleworkers 
discussing how states determine whether an individual is a “resident” 
or not and then distinguishes how teleworkers present unique 
challenges versus other types of interstate workers (such as mobile 
workers). It finishes by discussing the guidance states have provided 
concerning how they will tax teleworkers during the COVID-19 
pandemic period. 
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A. State Income Tax Rules 
States in the United States have the power to exercise both residence 
and source-based taxation over individuals.40 If a person is a resident of 
a state, the state exercises residence-based taxation, meaning that the 
state can tax the personal income of that person, regardless of its 
source.41 Conversely, when a nonresident earns income within that state, 
the source state may tax the worker subject to Constitutional restraints, 
namely the Commerce Clause and Due Process Clause. The source state 
can tax the nonresident’s income only for income derived from sources 
in the state.42  
In short, residence-based taxation applies to residents’ income, 
whereas source-based taxation applies to nonresidents’ income. The 
preliminary question then is how states determine whether an 
individual is a resident or not. This Subpart explains the rules 
determining residence and then discusses the difference between 
resident and source-based taxation. 
1. Determining Residence 
Establishing residence for tax purposes varies from jurisdiction to 
jurisdiction.43 In addition, many states employ multiple tests for 
determining residency. Some tests are more circumstantial, using fact-
based determinations, while others use more objective factors. 
For the more circumstantial, fact-based determination for residency, 
most states define a “resident” for income tax purposes as someone who 
is “domiciled” in the state.44 Generally, domicile is defined as the place 
an individual considers to be their home. A home is a place to which an 
 
 40 See, e.g., Shaffer v. Carter, 252 U.S. 37, 52 (1920) (stating “just as a State may 
impose general income taxes upon its own citizens and residents whose persons are 
subject to its control, it may . . . levy a duty of like character, and not more onerous in 
its effect, upon incomes accruing to non-residents from their property or business 
within the State, or their occupations carried on therein”). 
 41 N.Y. ex rel. Cohn v. Graves, 300 U.S. 308, 313 (1937) (holding that determination 
of residency allows a jurisdiction to tax the taxpayer’s income regardless of source); see 
also HELLERSTEIN ET AL., supra note 2, at 379. 
 42 See HELLERSTEIN ET AL., supra note 2, at 379. 
 43 Id. at 380; Scott R. Thomas, Domicile in Multistate Personal Income Tax Residency 
Matters: Enter the Swamp at Your Own Peril, 39 PACE L. REV. 875, 876 (2019); Lee 
Allison, Kathleen Saunders Gregor & Andrew Yarrows, When Down the Hall Becomes 
Across State Lines-Part 1 (1), BLOOMBERG TAX (Oct. 23, 2020, 7:56 AM), 
https://news.bloomberglaw.com/daily-tax-report/when-down-the-hall-becomes-across-
state-lines-part-1 [https://perma.cc/9TZ6-4LKX]. 
 44 E.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 316.027(1)(a)(A) (2021). 
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individual intends to return when absent from a state for a period of 
time. Many states also provide that a person may only have one domicile 
at any given time.45 Once an individual has established a domicile, that 
domicile continues until the individual abandons it, acquires a new 
domicile, and resides in that new domicile.46 States consider many 
factors when making this domicile determination because evaluating an 
individual’s intent is a fact-based inquiry. 
In addition to the “domicile” test, many states also apply more 
objective tests for determining an individual’s residency status. One 
common test is the 183-day rule.47 If an individual spends in the 
aggregate 183 days or more of the taxable year in a given state, they are 
considered residents of that state for income tax purposes.48 Generally, 
those days may include whole or part days.49  
Other factors are also considered. Some include a subjective factor, 
such as whether the presence in the state is for anything other than a 
temporary or transitory purpose,50 and where an individual keeps “near 
and dear” items.51 Some include more objective factors, such as whether 
an individual votes in a state for an election, whether an individual 
obtains a driver license in the state, or whether an individual or their 
spouse lists an address within the state on a tax return or paper filed 
with a court or other governmental entity.52 Under these more 
mechanical approaches, if an individual meets these tests they are 
treated as a resident for income tax purposes. 
This is not an exhaustive list of the rules that states use when 
determining residency. Instead, they are a sampling. However an 
individual’s residency is established by a state, the residence state can 
then tax the entirety of that resident’s income.53 
2. Residence v. Source Taxation 
Residence-based taxation is only one way a state may exercise its 
taxing power. Relevant to teleworkers is the second form of income tax 
 
 45 E.g., OR. ADMIN. R. 150-316.0025(1)(a) (2021). 
 46 Id. 
 47 See Thomas, supra note 43, at 884-85.  
 48 See GA. CODE ANN. § 48-7-1(10)(A)(iii) (2011); MICH. COMP. LAWS 
§ 206.18(1)(a) (2021); UTAH CODE ANN. § 59-10-136(3)(b)(xiii) (2021).  
 49 See GA. CODE ANN. § 48-7-1(10)(A)(iii). 
 50 HELLERSTEIN ET AL., supra note 2, at 380; see also CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 18, 
§ 17014(b) (2021). 
 51 N.Y. TAX LAW § 605(b) (2021).  
 52 See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 59-10-136(3)(b) (2021).  
 53 See Shaffer v. Carter, 252 U.S. 37, 52 (1920). 
  
2021] Taxing Teleworkers 1163 
through source taxation. Many states exercise both residency and 
source taxation powers for income tax purposes.54 
Residence states may tax the income of their residents regardless of 
its source, including income from sources outside of the state. The 
justification for the residence tax is that individuals should contribute 
to the state they live in since it is that state which provides them with 
public services.55 Source taxation is different because it is based on 
where an individual’s income is generated rather than where the 
individual is domiciled.56 Generally, source taxation for teleworkers 
means a state imposes taxes on a nonresidents’ income only for the work 
performed while physically within that state.57 Source taxation is 
justified partially by the theory that the state providing the opportunity 
for an individual to generate income should have the right to tax that 
income even if that individual does not live in that state. 
Consider Sam’s example, who lives in New Hampshire but 
telecommutes for work to Massachusetts where her employer is located. 
For Sam, New Hampshire is the residence state since that is where she 
lives, and Massachusetts is the source state since Sam derives her 
income there. Because Sam is subject to two states’ taxing powers, she 
may be subject to the risk of double taxation of the same income — once 
under residence and again under source. Indeed, anytime an individual 
is subject to the competing rights of source and residence states, double 
taxation may occur.  
Under the United States Supreme Court’s jurisprudence, double 
taxation is not inherently unconstitutional.58 However, to avoid double 
taxation, most resident states provide a credit for taxes paid by their 
residents to other source states.59 This double taxation problem is 
further discussed in the context of teleworkers below. 
 
 54 Curry v. McCanless, 307 U.S. 357, 368 (1939).  
 55 Maryland v. Wynne, 75 U.S. 542, 582-83 (2015) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 56 Shaffer v. Carter, 252 U.S. 37, 52 (1920). 
 57 See, e.g., HELLERSTEIN ET AL., supra note 2, at 401 (providing an example that a 
nonresident traveling salesman attached to a New York office who spends virtually all 
their time in other states would only be taxed in New York for their entire salary). 
 58 See, e.g., Curry, 307 U.S. at 357 (finding the Due Process Clause of the U.S. 
Constitution does not bar multiple taxation); see also Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 
U.S. 267, 267-68 (1978) (“[A]n apportionment formula that is necessarily only a rough 
approximation of the income properly attributable to the taxing State is not subject to 
constitutional attack unless the taxpayer proves that the formula has produced an 
income attribution ‘out of all proportion to the business transacted’ within the State.”); 
Guar. Tr. Co. v. Virginia, 305 U.S. 19, 22-23 (1948). 
 59 HELLERSTEIN ET AL., supra note 2, at 386. 
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B. Teleworkers 
1. Distinguishing Teleworkers from Mobile Workers 
Before addressing double taxation, it is important to note that 
teleworkers present different dilemmas under double taxation than 
mobile workers. Although both teleworkers and mobile workers are 
particularly susceptible to the risk of double taxation, there are key 
differences to the risks each face.60 
A teleworker is someone who works for an employer in a state they 
do not live in and lacks physical presence but earns income from their 
employer in that state. The teleworker “commutes” to work through 
electronic means. Common examples of teleworkers include web 
developers, computer programmers, and software engineers. With the 
increase in internet-based technologies, individuals in other professions 
are finding it easier to “telecommute” and not work in the confines of 
their employer’s state. The growth in teleworking includes academic 
tutors, interpreters, and even attorneys during the COVID-19 pandemic 
as people work from home.  
Mobile workers are different. A mobile worker is someone who 
produces income from multiple states because they have a physical 
presence in each state during a taxable year. As a result, states can tax a 
mobile worker for the days where the mobile worker is physically 
present in the state performing work. In essence, a mobile worker’s 
income is apportioned according to their physical presence in a given 
state.61 Examples of mobile workers include professional athletes, 
traveling salespersons, lawyers, and those in the transportation 
industry. 
Of course, an individual may touch both categories. Nevertheless, 
those who purely telework present an interesting dilemma since they 
only have a physical presence in their resident state. 
 
 60 See generally Edward A. Zelinsky, The Proper State Income Taxation of Remote and 
Mobile Workers, COLUM. J. TAX L. (2020), https://journals.library.columbia.edu/index. 
php/taxlaw/announcement/view/350 [https://perma.cc/8XV6-3443] (providing that 
mobile workers’ key issue is taxation by multiple states based on physical presence in 
those states, while remote workers’ key issue is the potential claim of an employer’s state 
to tax the remote worker’s income despite having no physical presence in the state).  
 61 A caveat to this statement is that most states consider the mobile worker present 
in the state for that day if they spend any amount of time there. So, if a mobile worker 
worked in two states in the same day, each state would assert that that day’s income is 
“sourced” to their state. 
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2. The Risk of Double Taxation of Teleworkers 
In many cases, if teleworkers are considered nonresidents of a source 
state, then the source state imposes taxes on that nonresident’s income 
only for work performed while physically in the source state. 
Contrastingly, residence states exercise their power to tax the personal 
income of residents regardless of its source. In theory, teleworkers 
should not need to worry about double taxation since they do not have 
a physical presence in the source state, disqualifying source taxation of 
their income. But as discussed below, teleworkers do find themselves 
subject to the risk of double taxation even when they lack physical 
contact with the taxing source state.  
Note that the term “double taxation” of teleworkers in this Article 
targets source taxation (in addition to the residence taxation) that is 
imposed on teleworkers despite their lack of physical presence in the 
source state. Admittedly, if the residence state does not impose 
individual income tax, like New Hampshire, teleworkers may still face 
a source taxation problem, but not the double taxation problem, to be 
precise. However, the essence of the problem that this Article targets is 
the same, regardless of the residence state tax policy is — teleworkers 
confront an extra-layer of taxation by source state.62 This Article 
suggests readers take the term “double taxation” with a grain of salt in 
this context.  
Even though many residence states offer credits to teleworkers to 
remedy double taxation, such credits do not eliminate the problem 
altogether. Most states offer credits only to the amount of income taxes 
that their resident would have paid to the resident state if they had 
earned their income there rather than abroad. Often, the credits a state 
issues are lower than the tax on that income that the residence state 
already imposes. Take Alabama as an example. Alabama offers credits 
to its residents for taxes paid on income to another jurisdiction, and it 
issues a credit for the lesser of one of two ways. Alabama either issues a 
credit for (1) the actual income tax paid to another state or (2) the tax 
computed on the same taxable income in the other state using Alabama 
tax rates.63 As a result, a resident of Alabama with income from another 
state will always pay the higher of the two tax rates on their income 
from outside Alabama. 
 
 62 The only difference is whether teleworkers face double taxation, which should 
have been the residence taxation only, or single taxation, which should have been no 
taxation at all. 
 63 ALA. ADMIN. CODE r. 810-3-21.01(3) (1999). 
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Moreover, not all states that levy income taxes offer credits for 
teleworkers working for out-of-state firms. For example, Arizona does 
not provide a tax credit for teleworkers’ income taxes assessed by other 
states, such as New York, because Arizona does not respect New York 
as a source state.64 Tax agreements may indeed exist between some 
states for matters of double taxation. For example, reciprocal tax 
agreements permit residents of one state to work in another state 
without filing nonresident state tax returns in that second state. Arizona 
has reciprocity agreements with several states — California, Indiana, 
Oregon, and Virginia.65 However, Delaware does not have reciprocal tax 
agreements.66 Nor does Missouri. Nor do most states. Besides Arizona, 
only fifteen states and the District of Columbia have reciprocity 
agreements.67 And those agreements do not cover every relationship 
between the states. In addition, some states have rejected such 
agreements.68 As a result, teleworkers may be subject to double 
taxation. 
Not only is teleworking generally being attacked by post-COVID state 
mandates, but states are applying other doctrines, such as the 
convenience of the employer doctrine, to tax teleworkers. This special 
doctrine and its impact on teleworkers are reviewed in more detail in 
Part II.B. 
While the COVID-19 pandemic did not create double taxation issues 
for teleworkers, it has exacerbated them. And in turn, so has the 
response to the pandemic from other states. This is because temporary 
guidance adopted by states aim to maintain the pre-COVID-19 work 
arrangements to determine the source of income and residence of 
teleworkers. The states’ guidance in effect emulates the convenience of 
the employer doctrine as a way to become the source of income, 
exacerbating the double taxation problem of teleworkers. The next 
 
 64 See ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 43-1071(A)(1) (2017) (granting residents an Arizona 
income tax credit “only for taxes paid to the other state . . . on income that is derived 
from sources within that state”); Edward A. Zelinsky, Coronavirus, Telecommuting, and 
the ‘Employer Convenience’ Rule, 95 TAX NOTES STATE 1101, 1102 (2020) [hereinafter 
Coronavirus]. 
 65 Withholding Exceptions, ARIZ. DEP’T. OF REVENUE, https://azdor.gov/businesses-
arizona/withholding-tax/withholding-exceptions (last visited Sept. 10, 2021) 
[https://perma.cc/RFW5-T6WN]. 
 66 Tonya Moreno, Reciprocity: States that Don’t Tax Nonresident Workers, BALANCE 
(Mar. 31, 2021), https://www.thebalance.com/state-with-reciprocal-agreements-3193329 
[https://perma.cc/C7AL-W5QZ]. 
 67 Id. 
 68 Bologna, supra note 19.  
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Subpart surveys the guidance of various states and reveals the resulting 
problem. 
C. Guidance During COVID-19 
When it comes to issuing guidance on taxing teleworkers in response 
to the pandemic, states have reacted in varying manners. 
1. The States’ Responses 
As of June 2021, many states have not issued guidance regarding 
taxing teleworkers during the pandemic. These states include Arizona, 
D.C., Hawaii, Indiana, Louisiana, New Mexico, North Carolina, North 
Dakota, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Utah, Virginia, and West Virginia.69 
However, some states have issued guidance. One group of states 
maintains the location of the source before the pandemic, effectively 
allowing extraterritorial taxation on teleworkers’ income by source 
state. For example, Alabama states that an employee’s regular place of 
work is the state that will get to tax the employee’s income.70 For 
teleworkers, this means if they worked in a particular state before the 
pandemic, then that state would get to continue taxing the teleworker’s 
income. Other states adopting this policy include Georgia, Maine, 
Massachusetts, Mississippi, Nebraska, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, 
Rhode Island, and South Carolina.71 In essence, these states seek to 
maintain the status quo that existed before the COVID-19 pandemic.  
Other states have issued contrary guidance, allowing the primary 
taxing power of teleworkers’ residence state. For example, California 
issued guidance stating that the state from where an employee 
telecommutes is the state that gets to tax the income of that 
teleworker.72 Other states treating teleworkers similarly are Colorado, 
Iowa, Kentucky, Maryland, Minnesota, Montana, Oregon, and 
 
 69 HODGSON RUSS LLP, STATE GUIDANCE RELATED TO COVID-19, 
https://www.hodgsonruss.com/assets/htmldocuments/Telecommuting_5.22.20.pdf (last 
updated June 9, 2021) [https://perma.cc/E9TB-RTJ6].  
 70 Id. (indicating Alabama will not consider temporary changes in an employee’s 
physical work location due to COVID-19). 
 71 Id. 
 72 See generally COVID-19 Frequently Asked Questions for Tax Relief and Assistance, 
CAL. FRANCHISE TAX BD., https://www.ftb.ca.gov/about-ftb/newsroom/covid-19/help-
with-covid-19.html#Teleworking-and-the-Stay-at-Home-order (last visited Sept. 10, 
2021) [https://perma.cc/2EGJ-KJF6] (providing information in a “FAQ” format 
regarding tax relief and assistance policies and program taken by California during the 
COVID-19 pandemic).  
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Wisconsin.73 However, consider Chris’s example who relocated from 
California to Utah during the pandemic. Which state is his residence 
state? Both California and Utah may insist that they are Chris’s 
residence state — California based on Chris’s relocation being 
temporary, and Utah based on the 183-day rule.74 Chris would still be 
worried about the double taxation issue.  
Last, a third group of states have issued their own specific responses. 
For example, Illinois issued guidance stating that if a teleworker has 
telecommuted from Illinois for more than thirty days, the teleworker’s 
income will be subject to Illinois income tax and income tax 
withholding.75 Kansas has adopted a mixed policy, providing that an 
employee’s regular place of work may continue taxing the employee’s 
income between March 13, 2020, to December 31, 2020.76 Thereafter, 
the state from where an employee telecommutes will be the one that 
gets to tax the teleworker.77 Missouri allows certain employees to be 
taxed from where they are telecommuting while for others it allows 
them to elect if they want the state where the employee regularly 
worked before the pandemic to be able to continue taxing them.78 And 
Vermont stated that an employee’s home state will be allowed to tax the 
income of a telecommuter.79 
 
 73 See HODGSON RUSS LLP, supra note 69. 
 74 UTAH CODE ANN. § 59-10-136(3)(b)(xiii) (2021); see COVID-19 Frequently Asked 
Questions for Tax Relief and Assistance, supra note 72. 
 75 DAVID HARRIS, ILL. DEP’T OF REVENUE, ILLINOIS WITHHOLDING REQUIREMENTS FOR 
OUT-OF-STATE EMPLOYERS WHO EMPLOY ILLINOIS RESIDENTS WORKING FROM HOME DUE TO 
COVID-19 VIRUS OUTBREAK 1 (May 2020), https://www2.illinois.gov/rev/research/ 
publications/bulletins/Documents/2020/FY2020-29.pdf [https://perma.cc/P8R9-2XEC].  
 76 Kan. Exec. Order No. 21-01 (Jan. 26, 2021). 
 77 Id. 
 78 MO. CODE REGS. ANN. tit. 12, § 10-2.019 (2021). 
 79 Relocated and Remote Workers: Guidance for Employers and Employees, AGENCY OF 
ADMIN. DEPT. OF TAXES, https://tax.vermont.gov/coronavirus/working-remotely (last 
visited Feb. 18, 2021) [https://perma.cc/LKJ7-244N]; see STATE OF VT. DEPT. OF TAXES, 
2021 INCOME TAX WITHHOLDING INSTRUCTIONS, TABLES, AND CHARTS 2 (2021). 
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Table 1. State Guidance on Teleworkers’ Income80 
Guidance on what 




Source state to 
maintain the status 
quo of source 
Alabama, Georgia, Maine, Massachusetts, 
Mississippi, Nebraska, New York, Ohio, 
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina 
Residence state California, Colorado, Iowa, Kentucky, 




• Arkansas: Employee’s regular place of 
work (employer’s home state) until Dec. 
31, 2020. As of Jan. 1, 2021, the state from 
where employee is telecommuting. 
• Connecticut: State from where employee is 
telecommuting (i.e., employee’s home 
state) and a credit may be allowed for CT 
residents for 2020. 
• Delaware: through May 31, 2020, and for 
after June 1, 2020, if employee is not 
permitted to work in the office. 
• Illinois: Illinois gets to tax teleworker if 
employee is telecommuting from there for 
more than thirty days.  
• Kansas: State from where employee is 
telecommuting (i.e., employee’s home 
state) or employee’s regular place of work 
(i.e., the employer’s home state) for period 
of March 13, 2020, to December 31, 2022.  
• Michigan: Per informal email from Tax 
Policy Division, if a Michigan resident 
works remotely for a New York employer 
and that state taxes the wages, Michigan 
will give the resident a credit against the 
tax.81  
 
 80 Table 1 was created by the author, based on HODGSON RUSS LLP, supra note 69.  
 81 Id. at 21. This may be considered no guidance.  
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• Missouri: State from where employee is 
telecommuting (i.e., employee’s home 
state) or, for certain employers, employee’s 
regular place of work (i.e., the employer’s 
home state) if elected.  
• New Jersey: The employer’s home state’s 
rules dictate which state gets the tax (i.e., 
NJ employer with nonresident employee 
working from home, withholding based on 
NJ rule of sourcing to where work is 
performed). Pre-pandemic sourcing rule 
applies as of October 1, 2021.  
• Vermont: Employee’s home state may tax. 
No guidance Arizona, D.C., Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, 
Louisiana, New Mexico, North Carolina, 
North Dakota, Oklahoma, Utah, Virginia, 
West Virginia 
No state income 
tax 
Alaska, Florida, Nevada, New Hampshire, 
South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Washington, 
Wyoming 
2. A Most Troubling Response 
Of the states that have issued guidance, the most problematic is that 
of the states who decided to maintain the status quo prior to the 
COVID-19 pandemic. Although many of these states’ guidance are 
temporary measures, they still extend a source state’s taxing powers 
beyond what might be constitutionally allowed. The United States 
Supreme Court has held: 
[J]ust as a state may impose general income taxes upon its own 
citizens and residents whose persons are subject to its control, 
it may . . . levy a duty of like character, and not more onerous 
in its effect, upon incomes accruing to nonresidents from their 
property or business within the state, or their occupations 
carried on therein . . . .82 
So, a state is limited to taxing a nonresident’s income to only the income 
derived from sources within the state.83 Over time, the Supreme Court 
 
 82 Shaffer v. Carter, 252 U.S. 37, 52 (1920). 
 83 Id. at 57. 
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has taken a broad view of what may be “source.” Indeed, the Supreme 
Court has ruled: 
[a] [S]tate is free to pursue its own fiscal policies, 
unembarrassed by the Constitution, if by the practical operation 
of a tax the state has exerted its power in relation to 
opportunities which it has given, to protection which it has 
afforded, to benefits which it has conferred by the fact of being 
an orderly, civilized society.84 
Still, when it comes to interstate activities, the Supreme Court has 
declared “[t]he Commerce Clause forbids the States to levy taxes that 
discriminate against interstate commerce or that burden it by subjecting 
activities to multiple or unfairly apportioned taxation.”85 As discussed 
later in this Article, states seeking to maintain the status quo by 
extending source states’ taxation powers may violate the Constitution. 
Whatever the constitutionality, allowing states to maintain the status 
quo by extending source states’ taxation powers results in two primary 
problems. First, by states extending their source taxing power, 
residence states cannot collect a fair share of revenue while providing 
public services to their residents. Second, this situation exacerbates the 
long-standing problem of double taxation on multistate income. These 
issues are explored in greater detail in Part II. 
II. THE BATTLE OVER TAXING TELEWORKERS 
The problems of the states being unable to collect their fair share of 
revenue and its concurrent challenge, the risk of double taxation, are 
now manifesting in Supreme Court litigation in New Hampshire.86 
Massachusetts seeks to tax New Hampshire residents who once worked 
in Massachusetts, but now because of the COVID-19 pandemic, neither 
work physically nor live in the commonwealth. New Hampshire has 
sued, arguing that the taxation of their residents is unconstitutional for 
various reasons. In contrast, Massachusetts argues it is both appropriate 
and merely an extension of traditional tax law.  
Although the Supreme Court declined to hear this case as a matter of 
original jurisdiction, New Hampshire presented important issues in 
 
 84 Wisconsin v. J.C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435, 444 (1940). 
 85 MeadWestvaco Corp. ex rel. Mead Corp. v. Illinois Dep’t of Revenue, 553 U.S. 16, 
24 (2008). 
 86 New Hampshire v. Massachusetts, 141 S. Ct. 1262 (2021) (mem.) (denying 
motion for leave to file a bill of complaint). Justices Thomas and Alito would have 
granted the motion. Id. 
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multistate taxation for remote workers. This Part reviews the arguments 
presented by both parties and offers constitutional analysis of both 
arguments and of maintaining pre-pandemic work arrangements as the 
status quo for tax purposes. It also revisits New York’s long-standing 
“convenience of the employer” rule, which Massachusetts’ tax rule has 
emulated.  
A. New Hampshire v. Massachusetts 
New Hampshire v. Massachusetts represented the long-awaited (and 
inevitable) conflict between teleworkers’ residence and source taxation 
in the United States.87 On April 21, 2020, Massachusetts adopted an 
emergency tax regulation that applied retroactively to March 10, 2020, 
which changed Massachusetts’ tax policy to tax nonresidents who, prior 
to COVID-19, were employees engaged in business in Massachusetts 
and had changed their residence outside of the commonwealth, being 
treated for tax purposes as “source income subject to personal income 
tax.”88 Massachusetts then extended the emergency regulation and 
adopted it as a final rule. Initially, it was set to expire on the earlier of 
December 31, 2020, or 90 days after the Governor ends the state of 
emergency.89  
In response to Massachusetts’ regulation, New Hampshire Governor 
Chris Sununu publicly announced that the regulation is an 
unconstitutional attack on New Hampshire’s sovereignty and its 
citizens, indicating that New Hampshire would challenge the regulation 
with the Supreme Court.90 Shortly after, the New Hampshire Attorney 
General filed a Motion for Leave to File a Bill of Complaint with the 
Court. 
Massachusetts filed a Reply Brief in Opposition to New Hampshire’s 
initial motion. Considering the litigation’s potentially enormous 
 
 87 See New Hampshire v. Massachusetts, SCOTUSBLOG, https://www.scotusblog.com/ 
case-files/cases/new-hampshire-v-massachusetts (last updated June 28, 2021) 
[https://perma.cc/2Y94-NL67] (noting that this dispute focuses on whether 
Massachusetts’ tax rule constitutes unconstitutional confiscation). 
 88 Mass. Dep’t of Revenue, TIR 20-5: Massachusetts Tax Implications of an Employee 
Working Remotely Due to the COVID-19 Pandemic, MASS.GOV (Apr. 21, 2020), 
https://www.mass.gov/technical-information-release/tir-20-5-massachusetts-tax-
implications-of-an-employee-working [https://perma.cc/QMB6-X9VY].  
 89 See 830 MASS. CODE REGS. 62.5A.3 (2020).  
 90 Governor Chris Sununu, BREAKING: the New Hampshire Department of Justice 
is Filing a Lawsuit in the United States Supreme Court Against the Commonwealth 
of Massachusetts, FACEBOOK (Oct. 19, 2020), https://www.facebook.com/ 
GovernorChrisSununu/videos/3465352176887977 [https://perma.cc/XT6G-J9TW]. 
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impact, various other states, organizations, and individuals filed Amicus 
Briefs concerning the matter.91 On January 25, 2021, the Supreme Court 
invited the acting Solicitor General to file a brief in this case to express 
the views of the United States federal government.92 The acting Solicitor 
General Elizabeth B. Prelogar responded that this case did not merit the 
Court’s original jurisdiction and suggested that any potential harm 
upon New Hampshire residents could be sufficiently litigated in 
Massachusetts courts.93 After the supplemental briefs by New 
Hampshire and Massachusetts, the Supreme Court declined to hear this 
case on June 28, 2021.94  
On review of New Hampshire, this Article supports New Hampshire 
and argues that Massachusetts’ actions are likely unconstitutional. 
Massachusetts’ law is bad tax policy and does not accurately reflect the 
modern marketplace that exists post-COVID. Downplaying the 
importance of the issue by referring to Massachusetts’ tax rule as 
“idiosyncratic and temporary”95 is an incorrect assessment that misses 
the opportunity to modernize the multistate tax rules for increasing 
number of remote workers. 
To adequately explain this analysis, this section proceeds as follows: 
(1) pro-New Hampshire arguments supporting residence states, (2) 
pro-Massachusetts arguments supporting source states, (3) jurisdiction 
and standing, and (4) the problem with maintaining the pre-pandemic 
status quo in a post-pandemic world is unpacked illustrating the 
author’s perspective. 
1. Arguments Supporting Residence States 
a. Commerce Clause 
New Hampshire’s first argument is that Massachusetts’ rule violates 
the Commerce Clause as an undue burden on interstate commerce.96 
Article I of the United States Constitution grants Congress the power 
“To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several 
States, and with the Indian Tribes.”97 While first granting an express 
 
 91 New Hampshire v. Massachusetts, supra note 87. 
 92 See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 28, at 4. 
 93 New Hampshire v. Massachusetts, supra note 87; see Brief for the United States as 
Amicus Curiae, supra note 28, at 4. 
 94 New Hampshire v. Massachusetts, supra note 87. 
 95 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 28, at 21. 
 96 Brief for Plaintiff, supra note 23, at 25-30. 
 97 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
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authority to Congress, this clause also has been read to restrict 
regulatory authority of the states that discriminates against or 
excessively burdens interstate commerce.98 This second inference is 
referred to by many as the “Dormant Commerce Clause” and is 
characterized by the United States Supreme Court as a “tangled 
underbrush,” or a “quagmire.”99 
Despite the doctrine being a quagmire, the following is clear: a state’s 
taxation of nonresidents may survive scrutiny under the Commerce 
Clause only if it meets four requirements. These four requirements 
established in Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady100 are that the state’s 
tax must be: (1) “applied to an activity with a substantial nexus with 
the taxing State”; (2) “fairly apportioned” to activity occurring within 
the taxing jurisdiction; (3) nondiscriminatory “against interstate 
commerce”; and (4) “fairly related to the services provided by the 
State.”101 Since the test is conjunctive, failure to meet all four prongs 
spells doom for Massachusetts’ tax rule. Below is a short description of 
the arguments that are, or can be, made by New Hampshire and 
Massachusetts. Each prong will be further critically assessed in turn in 
Part II.A.4.  
i. Substantial Nexus 
From the perspective of New Hampshire, the entirety of the taxed 
activity occurs in New Hampshire, not in Massachusetts. The 
Massachusetts tax rule taxes the income of individuals living and 
working wholly within New Hampshire because those individuals 
provided services in Massachusetts prior to the pandemic. Even though 
the activities of these specific teleworkers used to be in Massachusetts, 
the fact is that many of these teleworkers no longer do so. As such, if 
the taxpayer is no longer performing activities within Massachusetts, 
then the taxpayer seems to lack a current nexus with Massachusetts. 
Indeed, it seems but for Massachusetts’ tax rule mandatorily extending 
 
 98 See, e.g., W. Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186 (1994) (noting that the 
Commerce Clause “prohibits economic protectionism-that is, regulatory measures 
designed to benefit in-state economic interests by burdening out-of-state competitors” 
(quoting New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 273 (1988))). 
 99 Nw. States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 457-58 (1959). 
 100 430 U.S. 274 (1977). 
 101 Id. at 279; cf. Adam Timmesch, The Unified Dormant Commerce Clause, 92 TEMPLE 
L. REV. 331 (2020) (arguing that Complete Auto is a combination of already existing tests 
provided through Pike’s Dormant Commerce Clause test, that there is no significant 
difference between the two tests since Wayfair, and that the court should apply the Pike 
balancing test for tax cases).  
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and maintaining the taxpayer’s prior nexus, there is no current nexus 
with Massachusetts at all. 
Conversely, when it comes to businesses, tax nexus typically only 
lasts for “just [a] taxable year.”102 Without a significant level of activity 
occurring during the taxable year within Massachusetts, extending 
nexus for indefinite periods of times through this tax rule would be 
unsound and difficult to prove that taxpayers have actually “retained” 
nexus with Massachusetts. Accordingly, New Hampshire teleworkers 
likely would lack nexus with Massachusetts but for this extraterritorial 
tax rule. 
ii. Fair Apportionment 
The Massachusetts tax rule taxes New Hampshire teleworkers’ 
activities which they perform wholly within New Hampshire.103 So, 
where 100 percent of their activities occur in New Hampshire, 
Massachusetts’ “fair share” should be zero. Under this theory, not only 
is New Hampshire the residence state of the taxpayer, but it is also the 
source state of the taxpayer since it is within New Hampshire that the 
taxpayer generates their income. Accordingly, New Hampshire and 
other residence states have a stronger claim to tax a teleworker’s 
income.  
Although a teleworker’s employer may still be conducting activities 
in Massachusetts, the teleworker is not. This is an important distinction 
because the teleworker’s income is taxed, not the employer’s. As such, 
the Supreme Court should find that it is fairer to apportion all the 
teleworker’s activities to New Hampshire, i.e., the teleworker’s 
residence state. 
iii. Nondiscrimination 
On its face, the Massachusetts extraterritorial tax rule does not seem 
to discriminate against interstate commerce as the rule taxes residents 
and nonresidents of Massachusetts at the same rates.  
In application though, the Massachusetts tax rule does discourage 
individuals from working in Massachusetts if they do not also live in 
Massachusetts. It also discourages individuals from leaving 
Massachusetts because, they will still be subject to Massachusetts’ 
income tax even if they do leave. The rule then would discourage the 
 
 102 Brief for National Taxpayers Union Foundation et al. as Amici Curiae in Support 
of Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File Bill of Complaint at 14, New Hampshire v. 
Massachusetts, 141 S. Ct. 1262 (Dec. 22, 2020) (No. 22O154). 
 103 See Brief for Plaintiff, supra note 23, at 11, ¶ 38. 
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free flow of workers in interstate commerce to some degree, even 
though the rule itself does not discriminate on the basis of residence. 
However, the weight of that burden would be hard to measure. 
iv. Fair Relationship to Services Provided by the State 
While Massachusetts’ income tax system may have been fairly related 
to the services Massachusetts provided to a taxpayer pre-pandemic, the 
tax rule at issue does not currently “reasonably relate[] to . . . the 
activities or presence of the taxpayer”104 within Massachusetts. At this 
point, New Hampshire is providing firefighter, police, government, 
health, and the like benefits to the taxpayers at issue.105 As such, New 
Hampshire is footing the bill to provide New Hampshire teleworkers 
government services, not Massachusetts.106 
b. Due Process Clause 
New Hampshire’s second argument is that taxing these teleworkers 
also likely violates the Due Process Clause. The Due Process Clause107 
of the Constitution prohibits a state from taxing value earned outside 
its borders because a seizure by the state where there is no jurisdiction 
is a denial of due process of law.108 Under Allied-Signal, Inc. v. Director, 
Div. of Taxation,109 for a tax rule to survive a Due Process Clause 
challenge, there must be “some definite link, some minimum 
connection, between a state and the person, property or transaction it 
seeks to tax.”110 Further, when an activity is taxed, “there must be a 
connection to the activity itself, rather than a connection only to the 
actor the State seeks to tax.”111 
First, Massachusetts law reaches beyond its borders and directly taxes 
individuals working entirely from their homes outside of 
Massachusetts. From a residence state’s point of view, a tax rule like this 
seemingly allows Massachusetts to tax a nonresident of Massachusetts 
merely because the individual’s employer has an address in 
Massachusetts. That fact alone does not seem to be linked to the activity 
 
 104 Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 626 (1981). 
 105 Brief for Plaintiff, supra note 23, at 10, ¶ 33. 
 106 Cf. id. at 11, ¶ 34 (noting that because New Hampshire does not have an income 
tax, the state pays for government services through various revenue sources). 
 107 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 108 See Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. 450, 463 n.11 (1995). 
 109 504 U.S. 768 (1992). 
 110 Id. at 777 (quoting Miller Bros. Co. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340, 344-45 (1954)).  
 111 Id. at 778. 
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that a teleworker performs herself, especially since Massachusetts 
banned individual taxpayers from physically traveling to and working 
in Massachusetts because of the pandemic. Such travel restrictions 
prevent the teleworkers at issue from purposefully availing themselves 
of the benefits of Massachusetts.112 Accordingly, the Massachusetts tax 
rule appears to violate the Due Process Clause on its face. 
Importantly, the Supreme Court has previously held that a Delaware 
court lacked jurisdiction over individuals in a derivative action when 
those individuals merely held the role of officers and directors for a 
Delaware corporation.113 By merely accepting those roles in Delaware, 
the individuals had not availed themselves of the privilege of 
conducting activities within that forum state.114 As a result, the 
individuals were not found to be within the jurisdiction of the Delaware 
court.  
Similarly, as is the case in New Hampshire, an individual who merely 
travels into a state to secure a role at a company arguably does not travel 
into that state for the privilege of conducting activities within that state. 
If that individual proceeds to telework from a different state after 
accepting the job, it seems under the Due Process Clause that 
teleworker would lack minimum contacts with the state where their 
employer is located.  
2. Arguments Supporting Source States 
For this specific case, Massachusetts and other source states can 
pressure the Supreme Court to invoke either one of two excuses for 
denying acceptance of this case in arguing their below points. This 
Section briefly lays out the arguments not just for Massachusetts, but 
for source states generally. 
The Massachusetts tax rule was passed to help maintain the status 
quo from before the pandemic.115 Further, the rule is temporary. Before, 
Massachusetts’ income tax system allowed it to “source” income to 
Massachusetts in a way that reflected the geographical location of a 
taxpayer’s income. If a taxpayer performed income-earning activities in 
 
 112 See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958) (discussing that “minimum 
contacts” exists in other contacts only when the defendant has “purposefully avail[ed] 
itself of the privilege[s] of conducting activities within the forum . . .”). 
 113 Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 216-17 (1977). 
 114 Id. 
 115 Greg Stohr, High Court Rejects State’s Challenge to Work-from-Home Taxes, 
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Massachusetts, then they would be taxed in Massachusetts for those 
activities. But for the pandemic, the New Hampshire teleworkers likely 
would have continued their income-producing activities in 
Massachusetts. So, the tax rule at issue simply allows Massachusetts to 
hold onto income tax revenue that it otherwise would likely not have 
lost without the pandemic occurring. 
Relatedly, the New Hampshire teleworkers at issue chose to work for 
a Massachusetts employer before the pandemic, arguably creating a 
substantial connection with Massachusetts. The New Hampshire 
teleworkers had the opportunity to work outside Massachusetts before 
the pandemic. Instead, they purposely availed themselves in 
Massachusetts to receive the benefits of working a job in Massachusetts. 
So, for the privilege of working for a Massachusetts employer, those 
taxpayers choose to have minimum contacts with Massachusetts by 
deciding to work for an employer there rather than in another 
jurisdiction, thereby justifying the temporary tax rule. 
Additionally, the Massachusetts tax rule does not impose different 
rates on nonresidents than it does on residents. Instead, it taxes those 
individuals who were working in Massachusetts before the pandemic 
and who have continued performing the same activities, albeit now in 
New Hampshire. And it taxes them the same as those who work and 
live in Massachusetts.  
Last, Massachusetts’ tax rule does not per se bar states like New 
Hampshire from adapting or setting up their own tax policies. So long 
as New Hampshire and other states pass laws conforming with the 
Constitution, they are free to do so. In this case, Massachusetts is doing 
as it has always done: taxing the Massachusetts source income of 
nonresidents who work for Massachusetts businesses. Other states do 
similarly.116  
3. Original Jurisdiction and Standing 
Although this case presents the chance to resolve the long struggle 
over the issue concerning taxation of teleworkers, there were two 
preliminary issues that would permit the Supreme Court to avoid 
reviewing the case. The first is the Supreme Court’s discretion over 
whether to exercise its original jurisdiction and the second concerns 
New Hampshire’s standing. 
 
 116 See, e.g., In re Manohar & Asha Kakar, DTA No. 820440, 2006 WL 721643 (N.Y. 
Div. Tax App. Feb. 16, 2006) (indicating examples such as New York taxing non-
residents from New Jersey and even Arizona). 
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a. Original Jurisdiction 
Article III of the Constitution gives the Supreme Court “original 
Jurisdiction” over cases “affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers 
and Consuls, and those in which a State shall be Party.”117 In addition, 
the Supreme Court has “appellate Jurisdiction” in all other cases “with 
such Exceptions . . . as the Congress shall make.”118 While Congress can 
limit the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction, the Supreme Court has 
found that Congress may not limit the Court’s original jurisdiction.119 
The Supreme Court retains discretion over exercising its original 
jurisdiction.120 In part, this is because the Supreme Court believes it is 
“structured to perform as an appellate tribunal [and] ill equipped for 
the task of factfinding[.]”121 In this same vein, the Supreme Court is 
leery of taking cases that might intrude on its chief role as “the supreme 
federal appellate court.”122 Because of the breadth of the type of cases 
the Constitution grants the Supreme Court original jurisdiction to hear, 
the Supreme Court has held that the Constitution gives them authority 
to exercise discretion.123 Otherwise, the Supreme Court’s ability to 
administer their docket might be impaired.124 
This reasoning worked in favor of Massachusetts’ position. In fact, 
Massachusetts rightly noted in their reply that original jurisdiction 
should be invoked only “when the necessity [i]s absolute and the matter 
itself properly justiciable.”125 As such the necessity for the Supreme 
Court to review this case may be questionable. The tax rule affects 
particular teleworkers, and those teleworkers chose to work in 
Massachusetts rather than New Hampshire. If those individuals wish to 
challenge the Massachusetts tax law, they may do so without the 
Supreme Court’s deliberation. Indeed, those individuals can challenge 
the Massachusetts tax rule by going through the long-established 
process of Massachusetts state taxation review.126 Because any 
 
 117 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2. 
 118 Id. 
 119 See Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 332-33 (1816). 
 120 See Ohio v. Wyandotte Chems. Corp., 401 U.S. 493, 497 (1971). 
 121 Id. at 498. 
 122 Id. at 505. 
 123 See Washington v. Gen. Motors Corp., 406 U.S. 109, 113 (1972). 
 124 Id. 
 125 Brief in Opposition to Motion for Leave to File Complaint at 11, New Hampshire 
v. Massachusetts, 141 S. Ct. 1262 (Dec. 11, 2020) (No. 22O154) [hereinafter Brief for 
Defendant] (quoting Louisiana v. Texas, 176 U.S. 1, 15 (1900)). 
 126 See e.g., id. at 22-24 (noting that individuals can seek relief from Massachusetts’s 
Commissioner of Revenue, Appellate Tax Board, and Appeals Court); Brief for the 
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potentially aggrieved teleworkers can litigate their claims through the 
Massachusetts state taxation review system, original jurisdiction is not 
necessary to resolve their claims and thus, arguably, should not be 
invoked. 
While this argument is technically sound, it has flaws. Aggrieved 
taxpayers can indeed challenge the Massachusetts tax rule through 
Massachusetts’ state taxation review system. But as pointed out by 
Edward Zelinsky in his brief to the Supreme Court, the Tax Injunction 
Act127 requires taxpayers contesting a state tax law to exhaust the taxing 
state’s administrative remedies rather than going to federal court.128 
Usually, this means the taxpayer must initiate their case in a state tax 
tribunal.129 However, “[t]hese tribunals are typically unsympathetic to 
nonresidents’ constitutional rights,” the primary concern at issue in this 
case.130 Further, even if a taxpayer exhausts their administrative 
remedies, the taxpayer is then left with the Massachusetts state courts 
to continue challenging the tax rule.131 Even for taxpayers with 
abundant financial resources, the cost and time involved in litigating 
such a claim that far is not practical. In addition, many states offer 
credits to their residents for income taxes paid to other states. That fact 
lessens the incentives for taxpayers to challenge tax rules like 
Massachusetts’.132 Supposing the tax rule is unconstitutional, allowing 
it to stand only because no one has the resources or time enough to 
challenge it seems hardly equitable.  
There is some push back on the Supreme Court’s right to retain 
discretion over whether to decline jurisdiction over interstate disputes. 
In this case, “Justice Thomas and Justice Alito would grant the 
motion.”133 They made the same point in Arizona v. California in 2020 
and Nebraska v. Colorado in 2016, opining that ”we likely do not have 
 
United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 28, at 11 ( “[I]ndividual taxpayers’ 
challenges to the tax could be raised through Massachusetts’s procedure for challenging 
tax assessments.”). 
 127 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (2018). 
 128 Brief for Professor Edward A. Zelinsky as Amicus Curiae in Support of Plaintiff’s 
Motion for Leave to File Bill of Complaint at 18, New Hampshire v. Massachusetts, 141 
S. Ct. 1262 (Dec. 10, 2020) (No. 22O154).  
 129 Id. 
 130 Id. 
 131 Id. at 19. 
 132 Although New Hampshire does not offer such credits to its residents, most other 
states do. 
 133 New Hampshire v. Massachusetts, 141 S. Ct. 1262 (2021) (mem.) (denying 
motion for leave to file a bill of complaint). Justices Thomas and Alito would have 
granted the motion. Id. 
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discretion to decline review in cases within our original jurisdiction that 
arise between two or more States.”134 In addition, ten states filed an 
amicus brief in this case arguing that such cases should be mandatorily 
reviewed by the Supreme Court.135 Their argument stems from a 
reading of the Constitution and 28 U.S.C. § 1251(a), passed by 
Congress, which does not state the jurisdiction it confers to the 
Supreme Court for original disputes between two or more states is 
discretionary.136 Contrastingly, other similar statutes passed along with 
this one do give discretion to the Supreme Court for other cases.137 As 
such, they argue that since the Supreme Court has exclusive jurisdiction 
over original disputes between the states, the Court should be required 
to review those cases. Otherwise, states with original disputes might be 
left without judicial recourse. 
This argument for a mandatory review of original disputes between 
the states suffers from two main ailments. First, the States’ construction 
of both the Constitution and cited statutes rely on several inferential 
leaps. No language explicitly supports their position. Instead, the 
argument relies on what is not said. In that way, their argument seems 
like the famous one made by Sherlock Holmes of the dog that did not 
bark.138 While not damning, the Supreme Court may be reluctant to buy 
into this argument, especially considering the second ailment. For the 
Supreme Court to adopt this argument, they would need to overturn 
decades of precedent where they have held that they do retain 
discretion.139 The Supreme Court reads the Constitution as already 
inferring discretion to hear cases of original jurisdiction.140 Asking the 
Supreme Court to give up that power seems like an unlikely argument 
 
 134 Arizona v. California, 140 S. Ct. 684, 684 (2020) (Thomas, J. dissenting); see also 
Nebraska v. Colorado, 136 S. Ct. 1034, 1034 (2016) (Thomas, J. dissenting) (“Federal 
law does not, on its face, give this Court discretion to decline to decide cases within its 
original jurisdiction.”). 
 135 See Brief of Amici Curiae States of Ohio et al. in Support of New Hampshire’s 
Motion for Leave to File Bill of Complaint at 1, New Hampshire v. Massachusetts, 141 
S. Ct. 1262 (Dec. 21, 2020) (No. 22O154). 
 136 Id. at 8. 
 137 Id. at 8-9. 
 138 SIR ARTHUR CONAN DOYLE, 1 SHERLOCK HOLMES: THE COMPLETE NOVELS AND 
STORIES 540 (Bantam Books 2003) (1892). 
 139 Nebraska v. Colorado, 136 S. Ct. 1034, 1034 (2016) (Thomas, J. dissenting) 
(“[T]he Court has long exercised such discretion [over Original Jurisdiction cases], and 
does so again today in denying, without explanation, Nebraska and Oklahoma’s motion 
for leave to file a complaint against Colorado.”). 
 140 See Vincent L. McKusick, Discretionary Gatekeeping: The US Supreme Court’s 
Management of Its Original Jurisdiction Docket Since 1961, 45 ME. L. REV. 185 passim 
(2018). 
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to prevail given that the Supreme Court retains this discretion as a 
means to maintain their supreme appellate court role. 
While not all agree that the Supreme Court should be mandated to 
review this issue, most agree that this is an important case of great 
consequence that the Court should have decided. For one, the dispute 
between Massachusetts and New Hampshire is not an isolated affair. 
Rather, it represents a larger, older, national issue. To date, five other 
states besides Massachusetts have similar laws that directly tax out-of-
state residents on the income they earn working remotely from their 
states of residence. Take New York, for example. Not only does it 
regularly tax the income of remote workers in neighboring states like 
Connecticut and New Jersey, it even taxes nonresidents in states as 
distant as Arizona.141 In addition, other states have passed tax laws like 
Massachusetts’ in response to the pandemic. For example, Ohio passed 
H.B. 197 in 2020, similar to the Massachusetts tax rule, the bill designed 
to address the COVID-19 crisis.142 It allows municipalities in Ohio to 
tax employees working from home during the pandemic and for thirty 
days afterwards as if they were still working as they were before the 
pandemic. While this does not allow the state of Ohio itself to act as the 
state of Massachusetts is allowed to under its rule, it does allow an Ohio 
municipality to tax income of workers who neither live nor work within 
the taxing jurisdiction of that municipality. That could include 
individuals who now live outside of Ohio altogether. Laws like these 
would result in billions of dollars of fiscal confusion and losses for many 
states since they end up crediting their residents for taxes paid to these 
other states. Accordingly, the profound economic consequences of 
these laws warrant review by the Supreme Court. If the Supreme Court 
had resolved this case, the decision could have determined how similar 
issues throughout the country should be resolved. 
Last, if the Supreme Court is concerned about maintaining its role as 
an appellate court, it may appoint a Special Master to take evidence and 
present a ruling.143 This would allow the Supreme Court to maintain its 
appellate role and review the special master’s finding should there be 
 
 141 In re Manohar & Asha Kakar, DTA No. 820440, 2006 WL 721643 (N.Y. Div. Tax 
App. Feb. 16, 2006). 
 142 H.B. 197, 133d Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2020).  
 143 Shira Scheindlin, The Use of Special Masters in Complex Cases, LAW360 (Aug. 15, 
2017, 11:36 AM EDT), https://www.jamsadr.com/files/uploads/documents/articles/ 
scheindlin-law360-the-use-of-special-masters-in-complex-cases-2017-08-15.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/HZ3P-FEBR] (noting how, with the parties’ consent, a special master 
can perform a variety of special duties including “mak[ing] or recommend[ing] findings 
of fact”). 
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any intensive fact-finding. That seems unlikely though since the issue 
in New Hampshire was a question of law: that being whether the 
Massachusetts’ tax rule amounts to an unconstitutional confiscation of 
nonresident income. Still, the ability to appoint a Special Master 
undermines the notion that the Supreme Court is “illequipped” for fact 
finding.144 
b. Standing 
Also at issue is whether New Hampshire has standing to bring this 
case. Under Massachusetts’ theory, New Hampshire is merely grafting 
its aggrieved citizens’ claims onto itself and claiming that New 
Hampshire itself is threatened. If so, this likely would not be enough for 
New Hampshire to have standing.145 Instead, New Hampshire must bear 
its own injuries. And those injuries must be serious.146 
This argument is fairly sound. In many ways, New Hampshire appears 
to lack standing. Arguably, Massachusetts’ tax rule does not deter 
businesses or persons from moving into New Hampshire. If a business 
or person moves to New Hampshire to both live and work there, that 
business or person will not trigger Massachusetts’ tax rule. That rule 
may discourage persons from living in New Hampshire and working in 
Massachusetts, but again, the challenged tax rule does not discourage 
the movement of people and businesses into New Hampshire outright. 
Further, Massachusetts argues that its tax rule is temporary and was 
passed in response to a state of emergency.147  
Nevertheless, “[e]mergency does not create power.”148 As for the 
temporariness of this rule, Massachusetts has extended its effect 
repeatedly.149 It does not follow that because a State had nexus with an 
 
 144 Ohio v. Wyandotte Chems. Corp., 401 U.S. 493, 498 (1971). 
 145 See, e.g., Kansas v. Colorado, 533 U.S. 1, 8 (2001) (“[I]n order to invoke . . . 
original jurisdiction, ‘the State must show a direct interest of its own and not merely 
seek recovery for the benefit of individuals who are the real parties in interest.’” (quoting 
Oklahoma ex rel. Johnson v. Cook, 304 U.S. 387, 396 (1938))). 
 146 See North Dakota v. Minnesota, 263 U.S. 365, 374 (1923). 
 147 Cf. Brief in Opposition to Motion for Leave to File Bill of Complaint at 7 ¶ 2, New 
Hampshire v. Massachusetts, 141 S. Ct. 1262 (Dec. 11, 2020) (No. 22O154) (indicating 
the April 21 emergency regulation maintained the status quo for personal income tax). 
 148 Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 425 (1934). 
 149 830 MASS. CODE REGS. 62.5A.3 (2021) (first promulgated on October 16, 2020; 
re-promulgated on March 5, 2021); TIR 20-15: Revised Guidance on the Massachusetts 
Tax Implications of an Employee Working Remotely Due to the COVID-19 Pandemic, 
MASS.GOV (Dec. 8, 2020), https://www.mass.gov/technical-information-release/tir-20-
15-revised-guidance-on-the-massachusetts-tax-implications-of [https://perma.cc/GR7C-
Z633] [hereinafter TIR 20-15] (indicating extension until ninety days after the state of 
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individual before the pandemic that it maintains that nexus so long as 
there is a pandemic. Afterall, a tax nexus can expire if not maintained. 
To allow otherwise is to permit “trailing nexus on steroids[.]”150 The 
fact that this law attempts to continue the status quo from before the 
pandemic does lean in favor of Massachusetts, yet for the reasons 
discussed below, there are drawbacks to preserving that status quo. 
Declining to hear this case, the Supreme Court may have thought that 
New Hampshire did not have standing to bring this suit. New 
Hampshire’s chief claimed injury in this case is the invasion of its 
sovereignty. This theory relies on the assumption that by Massachusetts 
taxing a New Hampshire resident’s income, Massachusetts strips New 
Hampshire of its power to tax or not tax its residents living and working 
wholly within the state as it sees fit. Granted, tax nexus is more 
complicated than that, but consider the problem from the view of a 
different body of law; one generally would not expect an individual 
living and working wholly within State A would be subject to the 
criminal laws of another state, State B, by committing a crime in State 
A. But that is what Massachusetts’ tax rule does — not just figuratively, 
but literally. If a New Hampshire resident at issue fails to comply with 
Massachusetts’ tax rule despite working and living wholly within New 
Hampshire, they may be subject to both civil and criminal penalties in 
Massachusetts. In that way, Massachusetts steps over the border and 
places more than just tax jurisdiction over a New Hampshire resident. 
And from New Hampshire’s end, it could not remedy this situation even 
if it changed its tax policies. Accordingly, this further indicates that 
Massachusetts’ tax rule undermines New Hampshire’s sovereignty over 
its citizens. For those reasons, this case is not merely one where New 
Hampshire is standing in the shoes of its citizens; it brings its own 
issues. 
Even if New Hampshire is not itself harmed by these laws, arguably 
the state can assert parens patriae standing because it has a quasi-
sovereign interest in protecting the “health and well-being — both 
physical and economic — of its residents.”151 Regardless, even if New 
Hampshire lacked these above means of standing, other States are 
harmed by these laws. As discussed above, five other States besides 
Massachusetts have tax rules that tax remote workers outside of their 
 
emergency in Massachusetts has been lifted); see also HODGSON RUSS LLP, supra note 69 
(indicating original applicability between March 10, 2020 and December 31, 2020).  
 150 Paul Williams, Justices Should Block Mass. Telework Tax Rule, Prof Says, LAW360 
(Dec. 2, 2020, 8:25 PM EST), https://www.law360.com/tax-authority/articles/1332419/ 
justices-should-block-mass-telework-tax-rule-prof-says [https://perma.cc/3AB2-YL6K]. 
 151 Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 607 (1982). 
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borders. This results in the risk of double taxation of interstate 
telecommuters while the States also suffer fiscally by giving credits to 
their taxpayers to alleviate undesirable conditions. Further, it is 
typically the teleworker’s home state that provides them with public 
services. So, not only is a teleworker’s home state providing them with 
public services, it also in a sense subsidizes the other source state by 
providing them with tax credits. As a result, the teleworker’s home state 
suffers a concrete, fiscal loss. 
In sum, this Article argues that New Hampshire does, in fact, have 
standing to bring suit. Or if not New Hampshire, then other similarly 
aggrieved States. It is regrettable that the Supreme Court did not accept 
this case to resolve the issue concerning the taxation of teleworkers 
post-pandemic. 
4. Constitutional Challenges in Maintaining Pre-COVID Work 
Arrangements for Tax Purposes 
Built on the various arguments of the residence and source states 
introduced in the previous Subparts, and despite the Supreme Court’s 
decision not to hear this case, this Subpart addresses the author’s view 
of the merits of New Hampshire’s constitutional claims as well as its 
standing issue. 
The question is whether Massachusetts may continue to tax the 
income of a nonresident worker who once worked physically in 
Massachusetts but now, because of the COVID-19 pandemic, does not 
live in or work physically in the taxing state. This problem originates 
from Massachusetts’ attempt to maintain pre-COVID work 
arrangements as the status quo and as it tries to exercise its 
extraterritorial taxing right as a source state on nonresident’s income. 
As explained in Part II.B. below, Massachusetts’ new rule emulates New 
York’s “convenience of the employer” rule, which treats out-of-state 
telecommuters’ income as always sourced in New York unless the 
remote work is performed for the necessity of the employer. Projecting 
a source state’s taxing power extraterritorially on nonresidents’ income 
even if they are not physically present in the source state has been 
seriously criticized by many scholars.152  
 
 152 See, e.g., Meredith A. Bentley, Huckaby v. New York State Division of Tax 
Appeals: In Upholding the Current Tax Treatment of Telecommuters, the Court of Appeals 
Demonstrates the Need for Legislative Action, 80 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1147, 1152-53 (2006) 
(describing the negative impact of New York’s rule that taxes telecommuters); see also 
Brian C. Borie, The Convenience of the Employer Test: Why We Should Reconsider the 
Critique of New York’s Tax Apportionment Scheme, 72 ALB. L. REV. 789, 790 (2009) 
(noting the criticism New York’s rule has experienced). 
  
1186 University of California, Davis [Vol. 55:1149 
Hence, although the problem in New Hampshire has occurred in the 
wake of COVID-19, the issue is not new. The primary concern 
addressed herein is whether a source state’s extraterritorial taxation of 
nonresident teleworkers’ income is constitutional, especially when 
teleworkers are not physically present in the source state. This requires 
Dormant Commerce Clause analysis because the aggressive source 
taxation may harm free movement across states and adversely impact 
interstate commerce.153  
Again, for Massachusetts to pass the Dormant Commerce Clause test, 
its new law must be (1) applied to an activity with a substantial nexus 
within the taxing state; (2) fairly apportioned; (3) nondiscriminatory — 
i.e., does it discriminate against interstate commerce; and (4) fairly 
related to the services provided by the state.154 If Massachusetts fails on 
any one of these four prongs in the Complete Auto test, then the entire 
tax rule fails. This Article argues that the Massachusetts tax rule fails 
this test and is unconstitutional.  
(1) Substantial Nexus. Currently, the substantial nexus standard is in 
a state of flux as the Court reconciles traditional tax systems with a 
changing global economy that operates primarily online.155 To justify 
Massachusetts’ tax rule at issue, Massachusetts must have a substantial 
nexus to the individual taxpayers to justify the income tax.156  
In expanding the nexus definition in South Dakota v. Wayfair, the 
Court held that $100,000 in annual online sales in the state constitutes 
a substantial nexus because “the seller availed itself of the substantial 
privilege of carrying on business in South Dakota.”157 Some 
commentators might argue that because the Supreme Court scrapped 
the physical presence requirement for the substantial nexus prong in 
Wayfair, the virtual connection between the remote workers and 
Massachusetts would be enough to satisfy the substantial nexus 
 
 153 See MeadWestvaco Corp. v. Ill. Dep’t of Rev., 553 U.S. 16, 24 (2008) (indicating 
that the Constitution forbids states from imposing taxes that burden or discriminate 
interstate commerce, including burdening interstate commerce through multiple or 
unfairly apportioned taxation). Here, Dormant Commerce Clause analysis is required 
to determine whether a state’s extraterritorial taxation of nonresidents burdens 
interstate commerce and is therefore unconstitutional.  
 154 Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977). 
 155 South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2095 (2018) (noting a “dramatic” 
change in technology and commerce and how the Court “should not maintain a rule 
that ignores” [the virtual connection retail companies have to states] in overturning 
Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1992)). 
 156 See id. at 2099. 
 157 Id.  
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prong.158 However, this Article argues that it might satisfy some degree 
of connection, but it does not automatically satisfy “substantial” 
connection. We still must examine whether that connection constitutes 
“substantial” nexus.159 In addition, Wayfair is a sales tax case, whereas 
New Hampshire deals with income tax issues. So, the threshold for 
substantial nexus is likely different, but the question remains the same: 
at what point has a nonresident created a substantial nexus that triggers 
the application of Massachusetts’ tax?  
Massachusetts once had a substantial nexus on workers who worked 
physically in Massachusetts. However, since the pandemic, it now 
seems to lack this substantial nexus. Even before the pandemic, 
Massachusetts did not exercise taxing right as a source state for 
nonresident teleworkers who were not physically present there.160 
However, it extended its tax jurisdiction to workers who are now 
teleworking. The only justification offered by Massachusetts is that the 
rule is temporary.161  
Such argument would be more persuasive if Massachusetts’ tax rule 
was genuinely temporary. Although remote working began primarily 
for public health purposes, lifestyle have changed, and accordingly, 
Massachusetts’ nexus has decreased significantly. Massachusetts’ claim 
that its rule is temporary is not supported by fact as it ignores permanent 
 
 158 See, e.g., Darien Shanske, Remote Workforce Doctrine and Policy: Short-Term and 
Long-Term Considerations, COLUM. J. TAX L. (Oct. 21, 2020), https://journals.library. 
columbia.edu/index.php/taxlaw/announcement/view/350 [https://perma.cc/Z259-Z6MJ] 
(noting courts’ recognition of the declining meaningfulness of physical presence as it 
relates to economic activity); Hayes Holderness, Navigating 21st Century Tax 
Jurisdiction, 79 MD. L. REV. 1, 3-4 (2019) (recognizing that Wayfair eliminated the 
physical presence requirement, although presenting larger issues over the Dormant 
Commerce Clause nexus requirement).  
 159 See, e.g., Edward Zelinsky, Taxing Interstate Remote Workers After New 
Hampshire v. Massachusetts: The Current Status of the Debate 3-4 (Cardozo Sch. of L. 
Jacob Burns Inst. for Advanced Legal Stud., Faculty Research Paper No. 656, 2021) 
[hereinafter Current Status].  
 160 See, e.g., 830 MASS. CODE REGS. 62.5A.1(5)(a) (2008) (“When a non-resident 
employee is able to establish the exact amount of pay received for services performed in 
Massachusetts, that amount is the amount of Massachusetts source income.”); MASS. 
DEP’T OF REVENUE, LETTER RULING 84-57, WITHHOLDING FOR NON-RESIDENT EMPLOYEES 
(Aug. 2, 1984), https://www.mass.gov/letter-ruling/letter-ruling-84-57-withholding-
for-non-resident-employees [https://perma.cc/NN3P-DSQQ] (“Compensation . . . 
rendered by a non-resident wholly outside Massachusetts, even though payment may 
be made from an office or place of business in Massachusetts of the employer, [was] not 
subject to the individual income tax.”). 
 161 Brief for Defendant, supra note 125, passim (in defending the rule, Massachusetts 
continually refers to the rule as temporary throughout the brief); see also Brief for the 
United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 28, at 21. 
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shifts to teleworking and has extended this rule twice.162 Nobody truly 
knew when this “temporary” rule would cease to exist until 
Massachusetts conveniently ended the state of emergency right before 
the Supreme Court decision on June 28, 2021.163  
However, Massachusetts may still have some nexus as a state that 
offers employment opportunities, but it is far less substantial compared 
to the services provided by New Hampshire amid COVID-19. 
Nonresident workers being taxed do not receive the services of the 
Massachusetts police, fire services, road or highway construction, water 
systems, or utilities. Further, teleworkers are not relying on 
Massachusetts’ systems or government; instead, New Hampshire 
provides all of these services and has the governmental structure in 
place to support their lifestyle during this difficult time. Despite this, 
their income is being taxed not by New Hampshire, but Massachusetts 
which lacks a substantial nexus. 
(2) Fair Apportionment. The new Massachusetts tax rule lacks fair 
apportionment. Massachusetts’ pre-pandemic tax rule applicable to 
teleworkers correctly apportioned its tax between source and residence 
states because Massachusetts only taxed nonresident’s income for days 
they were physically present in Massachusetts. Income for days they 
telecommuted from home would only be taxed by the residence state. 
However, the temporary rule lacks apportionment for telecommuters 
by treating all working days sourced in Massachusetts, regardless of the 
worker’s physical presence.  
Although a residence state may offer a tax credit for taxes paid to 
another state, this should not be considered in determining the fair 
apportionment issue because the critical question is whether 
Massachusetts’ tax rule is being apportioned correctly, not if the 
residence state’s tax rules reduce harm to the individual. In the end the 
residence state is harmed by unconstitutional overreaching. A residence 
state’s tax rule may remedy double taxation, but this does not equate to 
fair apportionment. The broader principles of apportionment require a 
source state’s tax rule exercising extraterritorial taxing power to account 
for the general burden on the tax system itself. 
 
 162 See 830 MASS. CODE REGS. 62.5A.3 (2020) (first promulgated on October 16, 
2020; re-promulgated on March 5, 2021); TIR 20-15, supra note 149 (indicating 
extension until 90 days after the state of emergency in Massachusetts has been lifted). 
 163 Mass. Exec. Order No. 69 (May 28, 2021), https://www.mass.gov/doc/covid-19-
order-69/download [https://perma.cc/PJT8-KJPR] (ending COVID-19 emergency 
effective June 15, 2021). 
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In Allied Signal, Inc. v. Director, Division of Taxation,164 the Court held 
that a New Jersey tax on all of a corporation’s out-of-state activities, 
irrespective of its actual connection to New Jersey, was unconstitutional 
because it was not apportioned correctly and to adopt New Jersey’s rule 
would disrupt much of the nation’s tax system and was “certain to result 
in double taxation”165 Likewise, Massachusetts is seeking to tax 100 
percent of a nonresident teleworker’s income that is earned entirely out-
of-state, irrespective of its actual connection to Massachusetts, based on 
the premise that the nonresident teleworker had once chosen to 
commute to Massachusetts physically. This premise violates “the basic 
proposition that a State may not tax value earned outside its borders.”166 
Similarly, in J.D. Adams Mfg. Co. v. Storen,167 the Supreme Court 
found that an Indiana tax that taxed gross receipts of income of 
nonresidents originally sourced in Indiana was unconstitutional 
because it did so without apportionment.168 More specifically, Indiana 
was taxing one percent of sales made to out-of-state customers, 
resulting in double taxation of Indiana’s sales outside of the state.169 
This rule was too broad and lacked the required apportionment to pass 
constitutional muster and not burden interstate commerce. Similarly, 
Massachusetts’ law is too broad as it seeks to tax 100 percent of the 
income earned by nonresidents who neither work physically nor live in 
Massachusetts.  
(3) Discrimination against Interstate Commerce. The risk of a state 
instituting a taxing policy that would burden interstate commerce 
through double taxation is not a new problem. In Comptroller of 
Treasury of Maryland v. Wynne,170 the Court addressed Maryland’s 
policy of not extending a tax credit to state residents who paid taxes in 
another state, thereby having a portion of the taxpayers income taxed 
twice.171 The Court noted that a state under the Dormant Commerce 
Clause must not “impose a tax which discriminates against interstate 
commerce either by providing a direct commercial advantage to local 
 
 164 504 U.S. 768, 784-85 (1992). 
 165 Id. at 785. 
 166 Id. at 784. 
 167 304 U.S. 307, 311-12 (1938). 
 168 Id. at 310-11. 
 169 Id. at 311. 
 170 575 U.S. 542, 549-51 (2015). 
 171 Id. at 545. 
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business, or by subjecting interstate commerce to the burden of 
multiple taxation.”172  
Although double taxation itself does not necessarily violate the 
Dormant Commerce Clause, double taxation due to a discriminatory 
tax does.173 The Court has repeatedly held, including in Wynne, that 
state tax law must be internally consistent to comply with the Dormant 
Commerce Clause. With internal consistency, the court considers if 
taxpayers would face a higher tax burden if they engaged in interstate 
commerce versus intrastate commerce. This test assumes the challenged 
state law is universally employed by every state law and then assesses 
the burden between the two hypothetical states.174 If the burden is 
greater for interstate commerce, then it is not fairly apportioned and 
nondiscriminatory.  
In applying the internal consistency test, the income tax 
consequences of the following four taxpayers are compared: (i) a 
resident of Massachusetts with source income from Massachusetts, (ii) 
a nonresident of Massachusetts with source income from 
Massachusetts, (iii) a resident of Massachusetts with source income 
from another state, and (iv) a nonresident of Massachusetts with source 
income from another state. Also consider that when applying this test, 
the results must be different and less burdensome for nonresidents 
because a source state’s taxing power upon a nonresident is 
constitutionally restrained.175 However, before applying the test, it is 
important to note that the specific application of the internal 
consistency test would be different from that in Wynne, because the 
contested rules are different. In Wynne, the overall tax rates and tax 
credit policy of the residence state (Maryland) were at issue, whereas in 
New Hampshire, the “sourcing rule” for nonresidents’ income by the 
source state (Massachusetts) is at issue. Hence, Massachusetts’ tax 
credit rules should not get to the internal consistency test in this case. 
Applying the internal consistency test to the sourcing rule as well as the 
tax credits rule would trap the analysis into such circular logic that 
Massachusetts would be able to expand its sourcing rule for 
nonresidents’ income without any constraint as long as it offered tax 
 
 172 Id. at 549-50 (quoting Nw. States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 
450, 458 (1959)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 173 Michael S. Knoll & Ruth Mason, New York’s Unconstitutional Tax Residence Rule, 
85 STATE TAX NOTES 707, 710 (2017). 
 174 Adam B. Thimmesch, The Unified Dormant Commerce Clause, 92 TEMPLE L. REV. 
331, 362-64 (2020). 
 175 HELLERSTEIN ET AL., supra note 2, at 391. 
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credits, because such tax credits would arguably make the rule 
internally consistent, which is not correct. 
The hypothetical assumption of the internal consistency test 
continues with every state that universally adopts Massachusetts’ 
temporary sourcing rule and then the above four situations are 
compared with the burden placed on interstate taxation. However, the 
internal consistency test should not just compare the impact on the 
absolute tax rates of resident and nonresident individuals,176 but should 
consider the impact of each state unconstitutionally extending its 
sourcing rule, and thus taxing right, and the impact that would have on 
interstate commerce. 
Before the pandemic, a Massachusetts resident teleworker paid 
Massachusetts income tax on all income, including that from 
Massachusetts source. A nonresident teleworker paid Massachusetts 
income tax only if the income was sourced from Massachusetts and only 
for days the person was physically present — the teleworking days did 
not count as being physically present in Massachusetts. A state like 
Connecticut would then provide a tax credit for taxes paid to 
Massachusetts in a fair apportionment.177 Thus, there was likely a low 
chance of double taxation for nonresident teleworkers.  
In contrast, Massachusetts’ new tax rule shows internal inconsistency. 
The tax consequences of the Massachusetts resident teleworker remain 
the same. However, if a nonresident starts teleworking, the person is 
now subject to the risk of double taxation because Massachusetts can 
reach beyond its borders to tax a nonresident not working in 
Massachusetts. This is true even under the hypothetical assumption of 
fifty state adoption of the Massachusetts tax rule. Although the 
residence state might offer a tax credit, do not let that masquerade the 
unconstitutionality of the realities of the sourcing state that should be 
the absolute consideration of the internal consistency test.  
The application of the internal consistency test should not just 
consider a numerical tax rate but rather the newly created double 
taxation risk on nonresident teleworkers by ignoring the changed fact 
that the person is no longer physically commuting to Massachusetts. 
The internal consistency test needs to review the impact on interstate 
commerce as if every state could tax nonresidents without a proper 
apportionment. This would expose a nonresident interstate teleworker 
 
 176 Michael S. Knoll & Ruth Mason, The Economic Foundation of the Dormant 
Commerce Clause, 103 VA. L. REV. 309, 321, 329 (2017) [hereinafter DCC]. 
 177 See CONN. AGENCIES REGS. §§ 12-704(a)-1, 12-704(c)-1 (1994). 
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to the very risk of double taxation expressly banned under the Dormant 
Commerce Clause in Wynne. 
Massachusetts hopes that a residence state’s tax credit remedies this 
issue. Those who remember that Wynne took into consideration tax 
rates under the source state and the residence state tax, as well as 
Maryland’s tax credit rules, might be distracted by this argument and 
ask, “if every state offers tax credits for other states’ taxes, the double 
taxation risk would be relieved. Then is it not internally consistent?” 
The answer should be no. Again, the issue in New Hampshire is the 
constitutionality of the sourcing rule of the source state. Double tax 
relief is offered by the residence state. When the issue is the overall tax 
rates and tax credits as in Wynne, comparing the end result after the tax 
credits would be the right approach for the internal consistency test. 
However, when the issue is the sourcing rule of the source state, 
justifying the extraterritorial sourcing rule at the expense of tax credits 
offered by the residence state is clearly wrong. That is not how the 
internal consistency test was devised to be used. As Michael Knoll and 
Ruth Mason, the leading scholars of internal consistency test, 
emphasize, the double taxation issue must be distinguished from the 
discrimination issue.178 “[W]hether a state tax regime violates the 
dormant Commerce Clause depends on its impact on cross-border 
commerce, not on whether it generates double taxation.”179 Although 
the result of double taxation might be mitigated by some measure 
offered by the residence state, that does not make a challenged source 
state’s discriminatory rule constitutional.  
The taxing of out-of-state residents, irrespective of where they move 
to, ignores the burden this potentially places on the moving of taxpayers 
from state to state. Taxpayers should have the freedom to move from a 
less desirable state to a more desirable state without the risk of a state 
where they no longer live or work pursuing them for tax purposes. To 
allow this burden harms states like New Hampshire, Florida, and Texas 
disproportionately more than states like California or Illinois, because 
New Hampshire, Florida, and Texas have no income tax. With 
Massachusetts’ rule, Massachusetts’ residents have little incentive to 
move to those states for the tax advantage — the express reason these 
states do not have an income tax — thereby burdening interstate 
commerce and discriminating against the new residents of other states. 
This is a clear burden on interstate commerce. 
 
 178 Knoll & Mason, DCC, supra note 176, at 314, 331; see also Michael S. Knoll & 
Ruth Mason, Comptroller v. Wynne: Internal Consistency, a National Marketplace, and 
Limits on State Sovereignty to Tax, 163 U. PENN. L. REV. ONLINE 267, 281 (2015).  
 179 Knoll & Mason, DCC, supra note 176, at 331. 
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(4) Fair Relationship to the Services. Last, the tax must be fairly related 
to the services provided by Massachusetts. On one hand, New 
Hampshire argues that Massachusetts is taxing activity that is not 
happening in its state at all. This argument is persuasive but goes more 
to the issue of substantial nexus prong — not the fairly related prong. 
The question here asks whether the tax in question is “fairly related to 
the services provided by the State.”180 This prong may be satisfied by 
Massachusetts.  
The employment laws of Massachusetts protect nonresident 
taxpayers. If a nonresident employee experienced discrimination by 
their out-of-state employer or if their out-of-state employer stopped 
paying their salary, it would be in a Massachusetts court and under 
Massachusetts law that the dispute would be resolved. This likely 
constitutes as being fairly related and this prong seems to be satisfied.  
Nonetheless, the fourth prong of Complete Auto test must be satisfied 
in conjunction with the remaining three prongs. In fact, the Court has 
found that a tax violated the fourth prong in only one case, where the 
Court also found that the tax violated the second and third prongs as 
well.181 Hence, it is expected that the Court would offer a less apparent 
view on the fourth prong or blend the analysis with the other prongs of 
the Complete Auto test.  
In sum, the Supreme Court may likely find that Massachusetts’ tax 
rule violates the Dormant Commerce Clause because the teleworkers’ 
activity does not have a substantial nexus to Massachusetts, 
Massachusetts’ tax rule lacks fair apportionment, and it discriminates 
among interstate commerce by creating the unjustifiable double 
taxation of nonresident teleworkers’ income.  
Now, in relation to the Due Process Clause, the Court’s analysis 
would be similar to its analysis on Commerce Clause, as Justice Stewart 
emphasized that “[t]hese two claims are closely related.”182 However, 
the critical difference between the two clauses concerns which branch 
has the final say on the clause.183 As to the Commerce Clause, Congress 
has the power to enact legislation that might have a different approach 
 
 180 Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S 175, 197 (1995) (quoting 
Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977)). 
 181 See Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. Scheiner, 483 U.S. 266, 291 (1987). 
 182 Nat’l Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Dep’t of Revenue of Ill., 386 U.S. 753, 756 (1967). When 
the Supreme Court revisited National Bellas Hess in Quill, it did not use Due Process 
Clause but rested the tax nexus analysis entirely on the Commerce Clause. However, 
this position in Quill was overruled in Wayfair, where the Court consider the tax nexus 
issue under both the Commerce Clause and Due Process Clause.  
 183 HELLERSTEIN ET AL., supra note 2, at 34-35.  
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from the Court’s holdings on the Commerce Clause.184 Conversely, the 
Supreme Court has generally had the final say on the Due Process 
Clause.185 Under either clause though, the Supreme Court should find 
strong reasons to find the Massachusetts rule unconstitutional. 
Any hesitation for the Supreme Court to take this case was based on 
the preliminary issues, presented in Part II.A.3. New Hampshire has a 
policy position of having no income tax to attract businesses and people 
to live there.186 This creates a standing issue because New Hampshire 
may be considered not bearing any injuries on its own because the 
Massachusetts tax rule causes no foregone tax revenue. In addition, the 
Supreme Court retains discretion over whether to exercise its original 
jurisdiction. If the Court thinks that a judicial solution to the interstate 
commerce tax problem would be inadequate, it may not exercise its 
original jurisdiction; and it did. Many scholars, including the author, 
agree that Congress would be the best candidate to resolve the interstate 
commerce tax problem, such as the taxing of teleworkers’ income.187 
However, mandating a uniform tax rule for teleworkers by federal 
legislation has various paths, and it could take some time for 
policymakers to take one. In the meantime, teleworkers will suffer from 
the double taxation that results from so-called “temporary” rules 
adopted by source states. Invalidating those temporary rules projecting 
a source state’s taxing power extraterritorially can still resolve the issue 
because the existing rule on source and residence would then be applied 
and that does not create a discriminatory double tax problem.  
For these reasons, this Article regrets that the Supreme Court decided 
not to review this case. The fact that the Justices asked the Acting 
Solicitor General to express the federal government’s views might have 
implied that the Court wanted to punt the issue to the legislative body. 
Part IV discusses the legislative solution in greater details.188 
 
 184 See Norman R. Williams, Why Congress May Not “Overrule” the Dormant 
Commerce Clause, 53 UCLA L. REV. 153, 154-55 (2005).  
 185 See id. at 169. 
 186 Motion for Leave to File Bill of Complaint, supra note 23, at 1, ¶ 1-2.  
 187 See, e.g., Richard D. Pomp, New Hampshire v. Massachusetts: Taxation Without 
Representation?, 39 J. STATE TAX’N 19, 21 n.9 (2021) (“Congress is the best suited 
institution to develop a systemic solution to the taxation of nonresidents.”); Darien 
Shanske, Agglomeration and State Personal Income Taxes: Time to Apportion (with Critical 
Commentary on New Hampshire’s Complaint Against Massachusetts), 48 FORDHAM URB. 
L.J. 949, 964 (2021) (“[T]he Court needs to . . . prompt congressional action.”); 
Zelinsky, Coronavirus, supra note 64, at 1102 (“If the governor won’t stop New York’s 
irrational income tax penalty for nonresident telecommuters on the days they work at 
home, Congress should.”). 
 188 See infra Part IV. 
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B. Old Battles Against New York 
1. New York’s “Convenience of the Employer” Rule 
COVID-19 has reignited the debate about New York, and a handful 
of other states’, taxation of nonresidents’ income through the 
convenience of the employer rule.189 For New York to implement a 
taxation of nonresidents, it must follow the same requirements every 
other state in the United States must follow: a nonresident tax must 
abide by the constitutional limitations under the Dormant Commerce 
Clause and Due Process Clause. For example, New York adheres to 
these limitations by only taxing nonresidents on the taxable income 
derived from sources in New York.190 If nonresident employees perform 
services for employers both in and outside of New York, then income 
derived from New York sources is based on a ratio of working days in 
New York to total working days.191 This tax is essentially a fraction, 
where the employee’s total working days in New York (Din) are divided 
by the employee’s total number of working days (Dtotal).192 This fraction 
is then multiplied by the individual’s wages earned from that New York 
employer (WNY) to determine tentative taxable income.193 The equation 
is as follows: 
 
 189 To date, six states employ this test: Arkansas, Connecticut, Delaware, Nebraska, 
New York, and Pennsylvania. See Jared Walczak, Teleworking Employees Face Double 
Taxation Due to Aggressive “Convenience Rule” Policies in Seven States, TAX FOUND. 
(Aug. 13, 2020), https://taxfoundation.org/remote-work-from-home-teleworking 
[https://perma.cc/R4BE-DH9V]; see also ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 26-51-202, 26-51-435 
(2021); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 30, § 1124(b)(1)(b) (2021); 316 NEB. ADMIN. CODE 
§ 003.01C(1) (2021); N.Y. TAX LAW §§ 601(e)(1), 631(a)(1), 631(b)(1)(B) (2021); N.Y. 
COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 20, § 132.18(a) (2021); 61 PA. CODE § 109.8 (2021); STATE 
OF CONN., DEP’T OF REVENUE SERVS., 2019 LEGISLATIVE CHANGES AFFECTING THE INCOME 
TAX AND THE INCOME TAX WITHHOLDING 4 (2020), https://portal.ct.gov/-
/media/DRS/Publications/pubssn/2019/SN-2019(12).pdf [https://perma.cc/K7SE-9GGM] 
(eventually, Connecticut intends to adopt this rule by amending Connecticut General 
Statutes section 12-711(b)(2)); Letter from John Theis, Revenue Legal Couns., State of 
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(Din/Dtotal) x WNY = New York Tentative Taxable Income 
Thus, only a part of the income earned by nonresident employees is 
attributed to New York. But New York’s taxation might not be as 
innocent or straightforward as one would think. When determining Din, 
New York includes the number of days working out-of-state as being 
“in New York” if the employee works out-of-state for the employee’s or 
employer’s convenience, such as deciding to work from home or 
telecommuting. This doctrine only counts days worked not in New 
York if the employee worked out of state due to the employer’s 
necessity.194 Under the convenience of the employer rule, if an 
individual is telecommuting for the employer’s necessity, then New York 
would consider it as out-of-state source income and not include these 
days in Din.195 Conversely, if telecommuting is for the employee’s or 
employer’s convenience rather than the employer’s necessity, then the 
days worked are counted in Din, and the income is deemed as New York 
source income and taxed by New York.196 This doctrine is experiencing 
additional scrutiny and animosity due to the rise of teleworkers brought 
about by the COVID-19 pandemic.  
2. Extension to Teleworkers 
The convenience of the employer rule is probably one of the most 
controversial tax issues faced today due to New York’s stance that 
“telecommuting is for the employee’s convenience” and is not for the 
convenience or necessity of the employer.197 Hence, New York exercises 
its tax jurisdiction extraterritorially and taxes income earned outside its 
borders by nonresidents who telecommute from their out-of-state 
homes.  
Following New York’s lead, Arkansas, Connecticut, Delaware, 
Nebraska, and Pennsylvania have mirrored New York’s convenience of 
the employer doctrine.198 Further, Massachusetts’ emergency regulation 
 
 194 NY COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 20, § 132.18(a) (2021); Zelinsky, Ill-Advised 
Taxation, supra note 190, at 1002. 
 195 § 132.18(a); Zelinsky, Ill-Advised Taxation, supra note 190, at 1002. 
 196 § 132.18(a); Zelinsky, Ill-Advised Taxation, supra note 190, at 1003. 
 197 Zelinsky, Ill-Advised Taxation, supra note 190, at 1003. 
 198 316 NEB. ADMIN. CODE § 003.01C(1) (2021); 61 PA. CODE § 109.8 (1999); see, 
e.g., STATE OF CONN., DEP’T OF REVENUE SERV., supra note 189, at 4 (eventually, 
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taxing telecommuters who are displaced due to the COVID-19 
pandemic emulates New York’s approach.199  
As demonstrated by the growth of similar rules, the convenience of 
the employer rule can be seen as taxing certain intangibles that justify 
this sort of taxation. Some may argue the tax is justified because of the 
increased salary, reputational recognition, or access to clients that rely 
on New York companies. Although some of these benefits can be 
captured at the entity level, others cannot. By using the convenience of 
the employer rule, New York can capture gains from individuals who 
experience particular benefits that can only be derived from working at 
a New York firm.  
This concept is furthered by comparing it to a “classic local 
government finance issue as to cities and suburbs. If a big portion of a 
city’s tax as moves to the lower tax suburbs around the city, then the 
city is going to have a harder time providing the amenities that made it 
a city worth living near to begin with.”200 New York maintains a 
reputation that benefits those who are tied to it. The convenience of the 
employer rule can be viewed as a tax that prevents individuals from 
taking advantage of the benefits derived from working for a New York 
firm and as creating solidarity for all New York workers. 
Nonetheless, many commentators criticize this rule as 
unconstitutional and poor tax policy, especially when it extends to 
taxing telecommuters.201 In 2005, a majority of the Court of Appeals of 
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New York upheld this rule as constitutional when taxing 100 percent of 
a ten year Tennessee resident who only spent twenty-five percent of his 
time in New York; however, in the dissent, it emphasized that the 
application of the law had gone too far and is unconstitutional.202 
Professor Edward A. Zelinsky at Cardozo Law School, a critic of the 
“convenience of the employer” rule, even filed a lawsuit in the early 
2000s to challenge the rule. The next Subpart briefly introduces and 
discusses this case.  
3. Zelinsky 
The facts of Zelinsky are as follows: Professor Zelinsky commuted 
three days a week to Cardozo Law School in New York from his home 
in Connecticut. When he did not commute to New York, he worked at 
his Connecticut home preparing lessons, exams, and conducting 
scholarly research and writing.203 When school was not in session and 
during the entire 1995 fall semester, Zelinsky worked exclusively from 
home.204 However, under the convenience of the employer rule, when 
Zelinsky worked from home, his time was counted as if he were 
working in New York. This meant that all of his income was considered 
to be sourced from New York, which subjected his wages to New York’s 
income tax. Due to this, Zelinsky’s income from Cardozo Law School 
was taxed twice, once as a resident of Connecticut and a second time 
under New York’s convenience of the employer rule.  
In Zelinsky v. Tax Appeals Tribunal of the State of New York, Zelinsky 
challenged the rule’s broad application of being “in New York” as 
unconstitutional because it unnecessarily burdened interstate 
commerce, violating the Dormant Commerce Clause.205 He stated that 
under the second prong of the Complete Auto test, the tax was not 
constitutional and was being unfairly apportioned between New York 
and Connecticut.206 Under the Dormant Commerce Clause, a state may 
only tax source income earned by nonresidents as long as it taxes its 
“fair share of an interstate transaction . . . to ‘minimize the likelihood 
 
Empire State’s “New” Convenience of the Employer Rule, 2007 J. MULTISTATE TAX’N & 
INCENTIVES 14, 23. 
 202 Huckaby v. N.Y. State Div. of Tax Appeals, 829 N.E.2d 276, 285 (N.Y. 2005). 
 203 Zelinsky v. Tax Appeals Tribunal, 801 N.E.2d 840, 843 (N.Y. 2003). 
 204 Id. 
 205 See id. at 844-45.  
 206 Id. at 845. He also challenged the rule under the Due Process Clause, but the 
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that an interstate transaction will be improperly burdened by multiple 
taxation.’”207  
The Court of Appeals of New York found Zelinsky’s case did not 
impact interstate commerce and was constitutional. Assessing only the 
second prong of the test, the court found this prong was met because, 
first, the convenience of the employer rule was internally consistent by 
applying the internal consistency test.208 Second, the rule was externally 
consistent because it had an “economic justification for the State’s claim 
upon the value taxed.”209  
In determining that the rule was externally consistent, the Court 
adopted the view that because “many busy professionals, at the 
conclusion of a full day, routinely bring work home for the evenings or 
weekends . . . this work cannot transform employment that takes place 
wholly within New York into an interstate business activity subject to 
the Commerce Clause.”210 Thus, the work Zelinsky performed at home 
equated to bringing work home at the end of a full day, “the 
convenience of the employer test neither unfairly burdens interstate 
commerce nor discriminates against the free flow of goods in the 
marketplace.”211  
The Court’s rationale considered Zelinsky’s at-home research, 
writing, exam development, and lesson preparation to be in New York 
because “all of petitioner’s teaching is accomplished in New York and 
his voluntary choice to bring auxiliary work home to Connecticut 
cannot transform him into an interstate actor.”212 Treating professors’ 
scholarly and other non-teaching responsibilities as “auxiliary” and 
“ancillary,” draws this professor’s ire, and would draw objections from 
many professors. More importantly, the Court’s finding relies on an 
unwise policy rationale. Drawing a line between primary and auxiliary 
work responsibilities when evaluating the impact of interstate 
commerce creates ambiguity and invites additional adjudication. Such 
reasoning only opens the possibility for teleworkers to rechallenge the 
rule, especially in situations if the tasks performed out-of-state are more 
important or essential than those performed at the in-state office. This 
creates ambiguity and will be further challenged as many teleworkers, 
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in the wake of COVID-19, are doing more than just ancillary work from 
home. 
Further, the Court continued that even if working from home 
impacted interstate commerce, which would implicate the Dormant 
Commerce Clause, apportioning Zelinsky’s entire salary to New York 
was fair because he receives benefits from New York every day, 
including those days working from home, thanks to his employment 
opportunity in New York.213 However, this is merely a tautology 
because every multistate activity, regardless of whether it impacts 
interstate commerce, benefits from the source state thanks to the work 
and business opportunity there. The court merely evaded the real issue: 
what the fair apportionment of multistate income would be if the 
activity impacts interstate commerce. In the end, the court avoided the 
real issue leaving unanswered, “when do these types of taxes violate the 
constitution?” This may be an area that the Courts are leaving to 
Congress to resolve while taxpayers have both unanswered questions 
and uncertainty.  
Professor Zelinsky has again challenged New York’s convenience of 
the employer rule for his 2019 state income tax return.214 If Zelinsky’s 
new case works its way through the courts, it may offer yet another 
opportunity for the Supreme Court to review the taxation of teleworkers 
without the preliminary issues of original jurisdiction and standing, or 
temporary nature of the rule. 
4. New Jersey’s Attack Amid COVID-19 
Despite this Article’s critical view of New York’s convenience of the 
employer rule, plausible arguments could be made to defend it before 
COVID-19. One such argument is that the employee, who ultimately 
chooses where they will live, was generally expected to work in person 
on the business premises. An employee who was telecommuting was 
generally doing it for their own convenience and not for the employer’s 
necessity.  
However, the COVID-19 crisis has changed the analysis and rationale 
behind the rule. The State of New York and many of the businesses 
therein now encourage, and may even mandate, that employees work 
from home.215 Therefore, during the COVID-19 crisis, a good argument 
 
 213 Id. 
 214 Petition at 4, Zelinsky v. Tax Appeals Tribunal, 801 N.E.2d 840 (N.Y. 2003) (No. 
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 215 Zelinsky, Ill-Advised Taxation, supra note 190, at 1003.  
  
2021] Taxing Teleworkers 1201 
can be made that these telecommuters are working at home for the 
necessity of the employer rather than for their own convenience.  
As a result, New Jersey and other states are attacking New York’s 
taxation of nonresident telecommuters arguing that at least during the 
duration of the pandemic, New York is disregarding constitutional 
limitations by taxing nonresident telecommuters on income earned at 
their out-of-state homes during the coronavirus emergency.216 
Opponents of New York ask that the state suspend its taxation of 
nonresident telecommuters for the days they work from their out-of-
state homes.217  
In fact, New Jersey is advancing a bill (S-3064) that directs the state 
treasurer to “examine legal efforts to thwart New York from taxing New 
Jersey residents from working from home.”218 This bill was passed 
unanimously by the New Jersey Senate on October 29, 2020, and is in 
the process of becoming law.219 New Jersey would like to analyze the 
potential revenue that New Jersey could bring in if it were to collect 
those taxes itself.220 New Jersey residents who telecommute to New 
York are currently offset by New Jersey with a tax credit to avoid double 
taxation.221 This means that New Jersey has been foregoing its revenue 
as a credit to its residents due to the New York tax. It is estimated that 
before the pandemic over 300,000 New Jersey residents commuted to 
New York every day and subsequently paid taxes on income earned 
from commuting.222 State Senator Steven Oroho stated that “[i]f New 
York were prevented from taxing New Jersey residents who no longer 
go to work across the Hudson, we could generate hundreds of millions 
— perhaps billions — of dollars for New Jersey.”223 
III. IN SUPPORT OF RESIDENCE-BASED TAXATION FOR TELEWORKERS 
COVID-19 has exacerbated state battles over teleworker income. The 
unfortunate confusion and compliance burdens on teleworkers in this 
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country can and should be resolved. Between the source-based taxation 
and residence-based taxation of teleworkers’ income, this Article 
supports a residence-based taxation system for several reasons.  
This Part moves beyond constitutional concerns and reveals the 
fundamental problems with source-based taxation that attempts to 
maintain the pre-COVID-19 work arrangements. It then explores 
important theories that justify a state’s taxing right over its constituents 
to show that all theories support residence-based taxation for 
teleworkers. 
A. Are Pre-COVID Arrangements Still the Status Quo? 
Much of the justification for states that promote source-based 
taxation, like Massachusetts, is based on the premise that teleworking 
is a temporary symptom and reflection of the COVID-19 pandemic.224 
Early on, policymakers believed the pandemic and its impact would be 
temporary in nature and that life would soon return to normal.225 That 
assumption turned out to be incorrect. In fact, cities in America,226 
across the globe,227 and corporations from coast-to-coast228 now 
recognize that teleworking is no longer a temporary oddity of the 
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pandemic but is the new normal for how Americans choose where to 
live and work. 
Though there may have been a point where scholars and tax 
authorities realistically believed mass teleworking was temporary, it 
seems clear now that mass teleworking will be the new normal for 
millions of Americans. As such, the taxing principles for individual 
income tax should reflect the new status quo and allow states where 
individuals choose to live and work to be the source state for taxation 
purposes. This is the best position moving forward because: (1) this 
“temporary” work environment has no end in sight; (2) extending 
Massachusetts’ 2020 “temporary” tax order into 2021 likely lacks a 
statutory basis and continues to lose its legitimacy the longer the state’s 
“temporary” emergency order remains in place; and (3) not applying 
residence-based taxation for teleworking income ignores the evolution 
and inevitable development of post-COVID commerce by taxing 
employees as if they still work in a pre-COVID world. 
1. Teleworking Is No Longer Temporary 
When the COVID-19 pandemic started, there was a general belief that 
things would return to normal after a few months.229 Once normal, 
teleworkers who had left their work-states would justifiably be taxed as 
before by the temporary emergency orders enacted merely to maintain 
the status quo. But the old normal has yet to return. The effects of the 
pandemic continue in many parts of the United States,230 and while 
some sections of the economy are returning to work, many work 
environments are permanently shifting to remote models231  
Because millions of Americans are shifting to more permanent remote 
work, the United States is seeing a nationwide migration as residents 
choose to live in and work in states that better reflect their lifestyles,232 
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or that have a lower cost-of-living.233 Companies are aware of this 
change and are instituting permanent policies allowing workers to 
choose whether they want to work in an office or work from home.234 
Indeed, some companies have benefited so much from teleworking, 
they are choosing to permanently reduce their office space consumption 
by up to 100 percent.235 
The new normal manifesting from the “temporary” teleworking 
phenomena is not just affecting our workplaces, but it is shifting the 
fabric of our schools,236 the political make-up of the states,237 and even 
the family and home structure.238 Some scholars believe the impact of 
COVID-19 may be the most significant economic and cultural impact 
since the “oil shock and energy crisis during the 1970s and early 
1980s.”239 As such, American culture and society are shifting to adapt. 
However, one of the few segments of American society to resist the new 
status quo is the unique relationship between state tax policy and the 
taxation of teleworker income. 
For states to be the source tax state teleworkers who neither live in 
nor work in their states, the best argument to justify the lack of tax 
nexus is that the 2020 teleworking phenomena is temporary. After all, 
if things are temporary, then those teleworkers would likely return to 
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the source state soon. But for things to be temporary, there must be an 
end in sight.240 And the end of teleworking is nowhere in sight. 
Instead, COVID-19 has permanently altered the American working 
system and our tax structure. Each state is experiencing this differently. 
States like New York are experiencing a severe drop in residents as 
workers seek larger homes, more flexible lifestyles, and locations where 
the expected timeline for recovery from the pandemic is not as long.241 
Other states like Utah are experiencing a surge in residents, and the 
shock the local economy felt from the pandemic is quickly fading.242 
But even as the effects of the pandemic begin to end in some states, 
those states’ workplaces are not returning to pre-COVID work 
environments. Rather, they are adapting to the post-COVID 
expectations of workers and companies — those expectations being that 
workers should be able to work for their employers where they like and 
companies should be able to reduce their overhead by reducing office 
space.243 Therefore, teleworking is better viewed as an adaption for 
larger, more flexible, and more effective business, and not as a 
temporary solution to weather COVID-19. Teleworking is the new 
normal for American business. The nation’s tax law should reflect that 
fact by allowing the states where teleworkers live and work to be their 
primary tax state. 
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covid-19 [https://perma.cc/FJA2-K6S5]; Bryan Robinson, Future of Work: What the Post-
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2. The Unpersuasive Extension 
Massachusetts’ emergency tax order was termed as temporary and 
was scheduled to end at the end of 2020, or “until the state of emergency 
expires.”244 However, the state did not end the state of emergency for 
more than sixteen months after March 10, 2020, when the “temporary” 
tax order first took effect. On June 15, 2021, Massachusetts finally 
ended its state of emergency — conveniently right before the Supreme 
Court decision on New Hampshire.245 Still, for over sixteen months, 
Massachusetts had taxed nonresident teleworkers who received no 
support, benefit, or representation from Massachusetts’ government.246 
Massachusetts’ position is already subject to scrutiny. Extending the 
taxation of teleworkers beyond 2020 and for more than sixteen months 
stretches what already likely surpasses Massachusetts’ taxing authority. 
As discussed above, the very premise of “temporary” is that there would 
be an end date — it has been over sixteen months since Massachusetts 
extended its state of emergency, and it seems likely to continue for 
much of 2021. As of August 2021, the United States has entered the 
fourth wave of the pandemic,247 and it might not be surprising if 
Massachusetts reinstates the emergency tax rule. As this continues, at 
some point the executive order may shift from a temporary edict to 
simply a permanent executive order taxing workers who neither work 
in, live in, or even visit, the state. This was all instituted on the basis 
that teleworkers worked in Massachusetts at one point (but no longer). 
The tenuous authority Massachusetts relies on to be the source taxing 
state on individuals who have an almost non-existent connection 
weakens the longer the pandemic continues.  
 
 244 Elaine S. Povich, Remote Work Boom Complicates State Income Taxes, PEW (Oct. 
2, 2020), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs/stateline/2020/10/ 
02/remote-work-boom-complicates-state-income-taxes [https://perma.cc/969N-ESLG]. 
 245 Mass. COVID-19 Order No. 69, supra note 163 (indicating the COVID-19 state 
of emergency was terminated on June 15, 2021). 
 246 Abraham Gross, Mass. Agency Says Teleworkers Must Source Income to State, 
LAW360 (Feb. 12, 2021, 12:54 PM EST), https://www.law360.com/tax-authority/ 
articles/1354869/mass-agency-says-teleworkers-must-source-income-to-state 
[https://perma.cc/9MFK-SU8D]. 
 247 Karen Weintraub, The Fourth Wave of COVID-19 Cases Is Here. Will We Escape 
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B. A Solution for the Future 
Teleworking is only likely to increase in the future, not decrease. 
Taxing remote workers as if they live and work in states they neither 
live nor work in impedes interstate commerce and extends a state’s 
taxing authority well beyond traditional tax law parameters. Continuing 
this type of taxation lacks meaning for personal income tax, and, 
through increased complications tied to filing taxes in source states, 
likely reduces compliance.248 Alternatively, taxing teleworkers in the 
state they reside where they can see their tax dollars at work, may 
positively effect compliance. 
1. People as Physical Being in the Digital Economy 
Since the COVID pandemic, sixty-six percent of Americans telework 
at least part time and forty-four percent telework five days a week.249 
This trend seems likely to continue for many types of businesses that 
have no need for a physical workspace, including specialty service 
professions like legal or accounting services, customer service, 
technology, and other businesses representing tens of millions of 
working Americans. As teleworking continues to develop, eventually 
the question of whether there is a sufficient nexus for taxation will 
become increasingly muddy. To avoid confusion, the most meaningful 
way to determine a taxpayer’s individual income tax nexus should be 
the teleworker’s residence. The alternative, taxing an individual’s 
income based on the location of the business and where the employee 
“works,” is subject to manipulation,250 can constantly trigger Dormant 
Commerce Clause concerns, and seems to lack the due process required 
under the Constitution.251  
 
 248 See, e.g., Holderness, supra note 158, at 5 (arguing for considering compliance 
burden when determining Dormant Commerce Clause nexus requirement).  
 249 66% of U.S. Employees Are Working Remotely at Least Part-Time During the 
COVID-19 Pandemic, CISION (Apr. 16, 2020, 7:53 ET), https://www.prnewswire.com/ 
news-releases/66-of-us-employees-are-working-remotely-at-least-part-time-during-the-
covid-19-pandemic-301041859.html [https://perma.cc/HE82-KNRC]. 
 250 E.g., Chris Mathews, California Invasion: Houston Sees Big Business Gains from 
Coastal Corporate Exodus, HOUS. BUS. J. (Feb. 12, 2021, 6:00 AM EST), 
https://www.bizjournals.com/houston/news/2021/02/12/houston-sees-big-gains-from-
california-exodus.html [https://perma.cc/73E8-LFUF] (discussing the example of HP 
moving headquarters to Houston, TX while maintaining their operations in California, 
but still being able to shift some of their tax burden from California’s twenty-eight 
percent rate to Texas’s twenty-one percent corporate rate). 
 251 See supra Part II.A. 
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Hence, this Article supports residence-based taxation for teleworkers’ 
income. It is worth emphasizing that this position does not make the 
argument that 100 percent of teleworkers’ income should always be 
taxed by the residence state. Workers’ income earned by remote work 
should be taxed by the residence state, whereas income earned by 
(physical) commute should be taxed by the source state provided that 
the number of days working in the source state exceeds certain 
thresholds. Considering that many teleworkers may have a hybrid 
arrangement — sometimes they commute, and sometimes they work 
from home — income from the former would be taxed by the source 
state and income from the latter would be taxed by the residence state. 
This has been the norm of state income tax law since before the 
pandemic, except in those states with the convenience of the employer 
rule. This norm is likely more reasonable than the Massachusetts’ 
pandemic tax rule and the convenience of the employer rule, because it 
apportions the tax base of teleworkers’ and hybrid-workers’ income 
more fairly between source and residence states.  
This argument regards the physical presence of individual workers as 
an important factor to decide which state ought to tax their income. A 
potential pushback might arise if one considers the recent development 
in Wayfair, where the Supreme Court held that physical presence is no 
longer required for the substantial nexus prong in the Complete Auto 
test.252 Instead, a substantial economic nexus would be sufficient to 
require remote venders to collect sales tax on behalf of the state. 
However, this Article believes that interpreting Wayfair in such a 
fashion that limits the residence-based taxation of individuals’ income 
is flawed for the following reasons.253 
First, physical presence is important for individuals, as opposed to 
business entities, and perhaps even more meaningful for natural persons 
as the economy is digitalized and goes virtual. The author agrees that 
the physical presence requirement for business taxation is outdated in 
the digitalized economy.254 Worse, the physical presence or residence 
 
 252 See supra note 158.  
 253 See, e.g., Zelinsky, Current Status, supra note 159, at 3-4 (“Wayfair does not hold 
that physical presence (or its absence) is never relevant under the Due Process and 
Commerce Clauses. In the context of nonresident telecommuting employees, it is.”).  
 254 See, e.g., ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV. (OECD), OECD/G20 BASE 
EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING PROJECT: STATEMENT ON A TWO-PILLAR SOLUTION TO 
ADDRESS THE TAX CHALLENGES ARISING FROM THE DIGITALISATION OF THE ECONOMY 
(2021), https://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/statement-on-a-two-pillar-solution-to-address-
the-tax-challenges-arising-from-the-digitalisation-of-the-economy-july-2021.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/H4A9-VKR4] [hereinafter OECD/G20, TWO-PILLAR] (agreement to 
abandon physical presence requirement for international corporate income tax); Young 
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of a business is easy to manipulate and has been susceptible to 
aggressive tax planning of multinational enterprises in international 
tax.255 In that context, the critique’s reading of Wayfair is agreeable. 
However, people are physical; companies are not. In the digital world, 
the workplace of businesses and natural persons may vary, and even be 
virtual; but human beings always have a physical presence in a certain 
space. So, it is reasonable for physical presence to count more for 
natural persons. Because of such differences, the author supports a two-
track approach to international tax: residence-based taxation for 
individuals and source-based taxation for businesses.256  
To demonstrate the author’s position in the teleworkers’ multistate 
income tax, this Article supports the residence-based taxation for 
individuals, as opposed to businesses, especially the nonresident 
individuals of the source state. The nonresidents’ income earned while 
physically present in the source state still ought to be taxed by the source 
state. However, extending the source taxation for nonresidents’ remote 
work would be overreaching.  
Second, the issue of the physical presence requirement in Wayfair was 
about the tax nexus — that is, a minimum threshold question. However, 
states can set stricter requirements to establish source- or residence-
based taxation. Even Wayfair admitted those additional requirements 
for source taxation, such as certain amount of revenue and/or certain 
number of transactions in a source state for imposing collection 
obligation of sales tax to remove venders. International tax has a similar 
norm and developments. Currently, global leaders are negotiating a new 
international tax system to remove physical presence requirement for 
business taxation; instead, it sets other requirements for source-based 
taxation, such as global and local revenue thresholds, profits threshold, 
and revenue allocation formulae between source and residence 
 
Ran (Christine) Kim, Digital Services Tax: A Cross-border Variation of the Consumption 
Tax Debate, 72 ALA. L. REV. 131, 133 (2020) (arguing conventional rules about physical 
presence do not work effectively in the new digital economy). 
 255 See, e.g., Omri Marian, Jurisdiction to Tax Corporations, 54 B.C. L. REV. 1613 
(2013) (explaining that corporate tax residence is meaningless and proposing a 
functional approach to find proper jurisdiction to tax corporations’ income). 
 256 See, e.g., Young Ran (Christine) Kim, Considering “Citizenship Taxation”: In 
Defense of FATCA, 20 FLA. TAX REV. 335 (2017) [hereinafter Considering Citizenship 
Taxation] (endorsing citizenship taxation as a variation of residence-based taxation for 
individual income tax); Young Ran (Christine) Kim, Carried Interest and Beyond: The 
Nature of Private Equity Investment and Its International Tax Implications, 37 VA. TAX REV. 
421 (2018) (supporting source-based taxation for business profits earned by pass-
through business entities). 
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countries.257 Applying it to teleworkers’ income, the source state may 
have minimum nexus for remote workers’ income. However, that may 
not be sufficient to justify any kind of source-based taxation of remote 
workers’ income that does not involve revenue split between source and 
residence states. Wayfair does prevent a policy that this Article proposes 
— that is, a source state may need to establish requirements other than 
the minimum nexus, such as certain number of days working in state.  
2. Teleworkers and the Modern Tiebout Model 
Taxing teleworkers’ individual incomes based on where they live and 
work reflects not just the reality of the situation, it also honors the 
choice of individual taxpayers. For example, Chris who chooses to live 
and work in Utah when his employer is based in San Francisco may do 
so because Chris enjoys Utah’s weather, its outdoor recreational 
activities, being closer to family, or other reasons. But whatever the 
reason, allowing Chris’s income to be taxed by Utah as the residence 
state best reflects the taxpayer’s personal choice. Indeed, that choice by 
the teleworker to avail himself of the benefits of Utah vests Utah with 
the strongest claim to tax that teleworker. So long as a teleworker 
chooses to derive social benefits from one state, that state should be 
entitled to derive revenue from that teleworker. 
In the same vein, taxing teleworkers based on their choice of 
residence may also be prudent tax policy. Research done in 2014 
suggests that a taxpayer’s ability to demonstrate preference on 
government spending increases tax compliance.258 So, just as providing 
taxpayers more agency through “eliciting tax spending preferences” 
might be an effective tool in helping taxpayers to better understand the 
services they receive from the government and further engage them 
from being “passive” taxpayers to engaged citizens, so also perhaps 
could engaging the taxpayer’s agency in allowing their tax consequences 
reflect their choice of residence.259 In turn, this could increase tax 
compliance. To be sure, tax compliance is influenced by numerous 
factors.260 But implementing a policy that better allows teleworkers to 
 
 257 See, e.g., OECD/G20, TWO-PILLAR, supra note 254 (addressing tax challenges 
arising from the digitalization of the economy). 
 258 Cait Lamberton, Jan-Emmanuel De Neve & Michael I. Norton, Eliciting Taxpayer 
Preferences Increases Tax Compliance 6-10 (Harv. Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 14-106, 
2014).  
 259 Id. at 2-3. 
 260 Id. at 3 (listing some factors like “trust in government and tax fairness, tax code 
uncertainty, taxpayer socio-demographics, and numerous cultural and normative 
factors”). 
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demonstrate their preference on how they are taxed by choosing to live 
in their community would likely increase tax compliance more than a 
system where the teleworker’s funds go out of their resident state to a 
state they neither live no work in. Recognizing that many taxpayers are 
likely frustrated already with nonresident states taxing their income 
when they have no physical presence there, this proposed policy could 
well increase compliance. 
Teleworkers’ frustration regarding nonresident taxation is not just 
limited to having a voice in taxpayer agency and freedom of choice; 
taxed teleworkers are generally subject to increased taxation and 
potential double taxation as demonstrated in the example relating to 
Chris. States that fight to maintain the pre-pandemic work 
arrangements as the status quo are essentially maintaining the double 
and over-taxation of interstate, telecommuter income. Unless 
telecommuters are taxed on a uniform basis throughout the United 
States, double and over-taxation issues will remain. 
The increasing trend of teleworking sheds new light on the merits of 
the Tiebout Model in the digitalized economy. The Tiebout Model 
emphasizes the right of voice and exit to the individuals when choosing 
their community.261 If municipalities offer public goods and services at 
different prices — that is, tax rates — people with different valuations 
for those goods and services would choose a community that maximizes 
their personal utility. Thus, tax competition among municipalities 
would enhance the efficiency of allocating public goods and population.  
However, the Tiebout Model does not fully explain the benefits of 
metropolitan areas.262 People are willing to pay expensive rent and high 
income taxes to live near Manhattan or in the Bay Area. New Hampshire 
residents commuting to Boston are also clustered near Massachusetts. 
That is because such agglomeration provides huge benefits in terms of 
job opportunities, higher compensation, advanced skills, networking, 
and so on. Emphasizing people’s choice under the Tiebout Model and 
the residence-based taxation for teleworkers’ income does not fully 
appreciate the benefits of agglomeration, and thus is less convincing 
under agglomeration economics. 
The above is true, or at least it was before the pandemic, when typical 
teleworking would have been done at home in the metropolitan area. 
However, teleworking since the pandemic shows a new pattern. People 
 
 261 Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416, 
419 (1956). 
 262 See, e.g., Shanske, supra note 158 (noting more, but not necessarily most, 
individuals and firms learned they can relocate with the help of modern technology to 
find optimal tax and public services packages).  
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like Chris have not teleworked in their apartment in the Bay Area, but 
rather moved to Utah or Florida. The agglomeration economics that 
supports source states’ position loses its strength under this new trend. 
Instead, the Tiebout Model that values the individuals’ choice is worth 
revisiting under post-pandemic patterns.  
In a similar vein, the remote work revolution offers the chance for 
“economic dynamism.”263 For one, it tasks states to adapt their tax 
systems to the evolving work landscape. Employees now recognize that 
to be successful in a major tech career, an individual no longer needs to 
live in San Francisco. This recognition is extending beyond the idea that 
only tech-based jobs align with telecommuting. Many fields are 
recognizing adaptability to telecommuting. Employees realize they can 
work from a home office in Duluth, Minnesota or Wauchula, Florida, 
provided there is an internet connection. So, failure by a state to 
experiment and evolve along with the nature of work will have fiscal 
consequences.  
In response, some States will lose income tax revenue while others 
will gain it. An additional silver lining of the COVID-19 pandemic is 
that it has enabled high-income earners from major metropolitan areas 
and cities to move and work remotely in more rural settings. This has 
the potential to stimulate these more rural settings with increased 
income tax revenues and give them new fiscal possibilities. 
C. Tax Nexus Theories Support Residence-Based Taxation for 
Teleworkers 
Next, consider the taxation of teleworkers based on theories. While a 
state may declare sovereignty and argue that this implies the power to 
tax its constituents, the state must also “offer some prior normative 
justification for claiming those it seeks to regulate through taxation.”264 
This Subpart analyzes three representative theories on the justification 
of states’ taxing right, or tax nexus: (1) consent theory (or vote with 
your feet theory); (2) benefits theory; and (3) social obligation theory. 
Applying those theories to teleworking offers insights on which state, 
between source and residence states, ought to exercise primary taxing 
right on teleworkers’ incomes.  
 
 263 Brief of Amicus Curiae The Buckeye Institute in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for 
Leave to File Bill of Complaint at 21, New Hampshire v. Massachusetts, 141 S. Ct. 1262 
(2020) (No. 22O154). 
 264 Allison Christians, Human Rights at the Borders of Tax Sovereignty 11 (N.Y.U., 
Working Draft, 2017), https://www.law.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/upload_documents/ 
Allison%20Christians.pdf [https://perma.cc/W7E2-GN4A]. 
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1. Consent Theory: Vote with Your Feet 
The consent theory is often described as “vote by feet.”265 This idea is 
centered around the concept of a democracy.266 A democracy is 
“modeled primarily on membership combined with empowered 
voice.”267 Members of a democracy appoint representatives “to work out 
the details of democracy because people are too busy earning a living 
and dealing with their own problems to actively participate in the 
government.”268 Thus, because the people have voices and ultimately 
determine the level of taxes through their appointed representatives, a 
state is justified in taxing its residents.  
Dissatisfied members may choose to “exit” collectivity as an 
alternative rather than seeking to reform or respond by voicing their 
dissatisfaction.269 Therefore, individuals who purposefully choose to 
reside in a specific state are voting with their feet regarding that 
sovereignty’s powers, including the right to tax. In essence, they are 
entering into an implied contract with the state they reside in. If a 
resident is dissatisfied with the state’s powers, including that right to 
tax, the dissatisfied resident may choose to exit the state. Professor 
Hirschman describes this “voice” and “exit” concept as a “taxpayers’ 
ability to resist taxation through the political process of the taxing state 
and to depart the taxing state for a more favorable tax environment.”270  
There are some criticisms of the consent theory. First, the implied 
contract as part of a democracy can be questioned because a 
democracy’s voice only follows the majority’s opinion and does not 
necessarily consider minority views.271 Thus, the consent theory may 
lack merit because there is no real consent from all residents for a 
certain level of taxation.  
 
 265 Mark E. Warren, Voting with Your Feet: Exit-based Empowerment in Democratic 
Theory, 105 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 683, 683 (2011).  
 266 In this context, this theory is different from the Tiebout Model that seeks 
equilibrium provision of public goods and services and efficient allocation of 
population. 
 267 Warren, supra note 265. 
 268 Robert W. McGee, Three Views on the Ethics of Tax Evasion, 67 J. BUS. ETHICS 15, 
17 (2006).  
 269 See Warren, supra note 265. 
 270 Edward A. Zelinsky, Rethinking Tax Nexus and Apportionment: Voice, Exit, and the 
Dormant Commerce Clause, 28 VA. TAX REV. 1, 3 (2008) (stating “Professor Hirschman 
famously called the ‘voice’ and ‘exit’ options, i.e., taxpayers’ ability to resist taxation 
through the political process of the taxing state and to depart the taxing state for a more 
favorable tax environment”). 
 271 McGee, supra note 268, at 21. 
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Ruth Mason addresses this criticism by finding that for the consent 
theory to have real merit, two conditions must be present: (1) “the 
governed person must understand that continued residence means 
consent” and (2) “she must have a genuine alternative to remaining.”272 
Thus, if the governed resident, even if having a minority opinion, 
understands that continued residence in the state is implied consent to 
be subject to the majority’s decision of the level of taxation, then the 
first criticism of the consent theory regarding minorities lack of consent 
becomes less convincing. By remaining in the state or voting with their 
feet, a minority group is practically consenting to follow the majority’s 
decision. The benefit of having a democracy is that in return, the 
minority taxpayer has the opportunity to advance their opinion on a 
certain matter in the next election. 
As to Mason’s second point, some might argue that “even if it is 
theoretically possible to move” to another state, “it may not be 
practically possible or feasible” to do so because there are many barriers 
to freedom of movement.273 However, if it can be found that the barriers 
to the movement of a resident are insufficient to prevent the finding of 
a genuine alternative to remaining, then the second criticism about the 
impracticability of the exit option fails as well. Teleworking is a good 
example of people seeking an alternative to remaining.  
Another criticism of the consent theory is from the perspective of 
anarchists, arguing that future generations cannot be bound to the 
implied contract made by the original generation.274 Anarchists may 
argue that “laws, once passed, remain binding on all who live within the 
jurisdiction as long as the law exists” and “governments are like 
corporations” where they “continue to exist independently of their 
owners.”275 However, Thomas Jefferson responded to this, stating “[w]e 
may consider each generation as a distinct nation, with a right, by the 
will of its majority, to bind themselves, but none to bind the succeeding 
generation, more than the inhabitants of another country.”276 Some 
argue that Jefferson believed “laws have a natural expiration date as 
members of the generation who were of the age of majority when the 
law was passed start to die” and “one generation cannot bind another 
 
 272 Ruth Mason, Citizenship Taxation, 89 S. CAL. L. REV. 169, 188 (2016). 
 273 McGee, supra note 268, at 18. 
 274 Id. at 21-22.  
 275 Id. at 22. 
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generation.”277 Inspired by Jefferson’s position, it would make more 
sense to understand that each generation renews their implied contract 
with the government by voting with their feet through continued 
residence in the state and by electing the next generation of 
representatives.  
How can the consent theory justify taxation in the realm of 
teleworking? Put differently, in Chris’s example, which state between 
Utah or California ought to have the primary power to tax Chris? 
Consent theory would support residence-based taxation rather than 
source-based taxation. When Chris relocated from California to Utah, 
Chris has consented to be taxed according to the laws of Utah by voting 
with his feet.  
In Sam’s example, there is an explicit or implied contract between 
New Hampshire and Sam on New Hampshire’s taxing right. Sam has 
not consented through “vote by feet” to be taxed by Massachusetts by 
locating her residence in New Hampshire rather than Massachusetts. 
Moreover, there is no implied consent by Sam about Massachusetts’ 
attempt to project extraterritorial taxing right to her as a telecommuter. 
Hence, consent theory would uphold the residence-based taxation of 
teleworkers. 
2. Benefits Theory 
Under the benefits theory recognized by the Supreme Court in Cook 
v. Tait,278 individuals who enjoy the benefits provided by the taxing 
government should “bear the corresponding burdens — in particular, 
the payment of taxes.”279 Michael Kirsch notes at least four benefits that 
justify a state’s taxation of a resident: personal protection, property 
protection, the right to vote, and the right to enter the state.280 First, 
individuals often rely upon governments for personal protection, 
particularly in times of crisis. Second, individuals benefit from “the 
protection of personal property . . .” provided by the government.281 
Third, individuals benefit from the right to vote.282 Fourth, individuals 
benefit from the ability to enter the territory “at any time.”283 In sum, 
 
 277 McGee, supra note 268, at 22. 
 278 265 U.S. 47 (1924).  
 279 Michael Kirsch, Taxing Citizens in a Global Economy, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 443, 470 
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 280 Id. at 470-76. 
 281 Id. at 473. 
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governments are justified in taxing individuals when those 
governments provide benefits to the taxed individuals — whether 
through protection, civil liberties, or other benefits. 
However, as a theory, the benefits theory has been criticized from 
modern welfarism because the relationship between government 
benefits and taxation is more than a mere matter of quid pro quo.284 
Modern income taxes calculate the amount of tax by the taxpayers’ 
ability to pay, not by the benefits they receive.285 As Edward Zelinsky 
notes, “minimal benefits do not justify maximal taxation.”286 With this 
regard, the social obligation theory below accords better to the modern 
welfare state.  
Nonetheless, benefits theory is the most intuitively appealing to 
explain the government’s taxing right over constituents. Coming back 
to the example of teleworkers: under the benefits theory, which states 
have justification to tax teleworkers? Extrapolating from the crux of the 
theory, individual income taxes should focus on the physical presence 
or residence, and not source-based taxation because the physical 
presence of individuals indicates the locale in which they benefit from 
government services.  
In Chris’s example, Utah is justified to tax Chris. Chris lives in Utah 
and works from home for a business in California — he derives far more 
benefit from the government in Utah than in California. If Chris were 
to be confronted by danger, emergency services from Utah would be 
provided. If Chris were to go to their local park, the park would be 
maintained by Utah’s government; so too would be the roads near 
Chris’s home; Chris’s utilities are provided for by Utah; public 
education for Chris’s children is largely run by Utah. Contrastingly, 
Chris derives little benefit from California. Although Chris works for a 
business located in California, Chris benefits little from the state outside 
of being employed in it. Therefore, if the government of Utah provides 
a majority of the services enjoyed by Chris, then Utah is justified to tax 
Chris, and Chris in return has a duty to contribute taxes to Utah that 
provides benefits to him and his community.  
Sam’s example is even more salient because New Hampshire (not 
Massachusetts) provides benefits of medical services, among others, in 
the difficult time when Sam tested positive. Therefore, like the consent 
theory, the benefit theory supports residence-based taxation for 
teleworkers.  
 
 284 Kim, Considering Citizenship Taxation, supra note 256, at 338. 
 285 Mason, supra note 272, at 196.  
 286 Edward A. Zelinsky, Citizenship and Worldwide Taxation: Citizenship as an 
Administrable Proxy for Domicile, 96 IOWA L. REV. 1289, 1309 (2011). 
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3. Social Obligation Theory 
The social obligation theory justifies a state’s taxing right over its 
constituents because members of society have social obligations to 
support those in their society.287 This theory is built upon the moral-
philosophical idea that “people have a moral obligation to support 
fellow members of their own society.”288 Members of society only have 
social obligations to other members in their community and do not have 
social obligations to support people everywhere.289 Thus, under this 
theory, a government is justified in taxing individuals who belong to 
the jurisdiction’s community, and correspondingly individual members 
of the community have obligations to pay taxes to the government 
supporting the community.  
The question may arise whether residence is a good predictor of one’s 
community.290 As much as the social obligation theory is based on moral 
philosophy, it can also be criticized from a moral philosophical 
perspective.291 Social obligation theory hinges on the idea that there is 
a general obligation to obey the government’s laws for the social good.292 
While there may be a social obligation under normal circumstances, 
what if the community at issue is corrupt or involved in ethically and 
morally bad behaviors? Can taxation still be justified? Consider a Jewish 
community in Germany during World War II. It would be hard to argue 
that “Jews have an obligation to obey all the laws of the country, and to 
pay all the taxes they legally owe, if Hitler were the tax collector.”293 
Nor since, during that time, no other German taxpayers would have 
owed any obligations to Jews. For those reasons, it would be 
problematic to consider the Jews’ residence as their community for the 
basis of their tax nexus. The point of this criticism is that the residence 
proxy for community standard may have issues when governments are 
discriminating against a certain group of residents in the state.  
Nevertheless, while residence is not a perfect proxy for community, 
residence is generally where most people consider their community to 
be. Using residence to predict community is practical and 
administratively feasible. More importantly, when applying social 
obligation theory to the world of teleworking, it is obvious which state 
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between residence and source states individuals would consider the 
community to which they belong. The idea of a community 
encompasses much more than employment — it includes culture, 
customs, norms, values, all often located within a geographic area. So, 
an individual who works from home for a company located in a different 
state often belongs to the community where they live, not where they 
work.294 As such, the social obligation theory supports residence-based 
taxation over source-based taxation.  
IV. FEDERALISM AND A CONGRESSIONAL SOLUTION 
To offer a standardized and harmonized solution for the taxation of 
the multistate income of teleworkers, Congress should create federal 
law that enforces a residence-based approach for teleworking. This Part 
demonstrates that Congress maintains broad power to preempt state tax 
laws that currently prevent residence states from taxing teleworkers 
who live in their state. 
A. A Congressional Solution for the Interstate Commerce Tax Problem 
When it comes to conflicts with taxing multistate income, Congress 
has been notoriously passive in exercising their constitutional power, 
generally neglecting to offer a harmonized solution.295 Instead, the 
Supreme Court has created and relied on various jurisprudence on the 
issue based mainly on the Dormant Commerce Clause and Due Process 
Clause as a stop-gap until Congress decides to enact national 
legislation.296 However, the judicial solutions are inherently limited 
because the Court can only invalidate unconstitutional state tax rules 
and is incapable of reconciling the states’ competing interests.297 Many 
Justices over the years, including Justices Black, Frankfurter, and 
Douglas, have expressed views in dissenting opinions to leave the tax at 
issue for the consideration of Congress, allowing them to create a 
concrete solution because exploring “the problem of the taxing freedom 
 
 294 Some may argue that in Sam’s example, at least part of Sam’s community should 
be considered to be in Massachusetts, depending on the amount of time spent 
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of the States and the needed limits on such state taxing power” is 
Congress’ job.298  
Despite the increasing number of teleworkers who are puzzled with 
their multistate income tax, there is no official guidance by the federal 
government on the matter. As discussed in Part I.C, only a quarter of 
the states have issued tax guidance, raising the prospect of double 
taxation for some teleworkers because states are taking different and 
conflicting positions on how the worker’s incomes displaced by the 
pandemic should be taxed.  
The multistate tax obligations associated with working, even 
temporarily, in another state have long been a point of contention. Long 
pending federal legislation, called the bipartisan Mobile Workforce 
State Income Tax Simplification Act, would establish a uniform thirty-
day threshold before employees are required to comply with the income 
taxes of a state other than their state of residence.299 But for now, that is 
not the law — yet many employees are working in another state for 
extended periods.  
Recognizing the need for federal preemption, the Senate offered a 
solution (Remote and Mobile Worker Relief Act, S. 3995) as a part of 
the pandemic relief package in August 2020;300 this was later 
reintroduced in April 2021 (S. 1274).301 The solution that emerged in 
the Senate is a pandemic-specific version of a bipartisan mobile 
workforce relief measure that Sens. John Thune (R-S.D.) and Sherrod 
Brown (D-Ohio) have promoted for several years.302 Key features 
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include a thirty day trigger before states are permitted to impose income 
taxes, extending to ninety days during 2020 and 2021.303 Additionally, 
employers would treat their workers’ income as earned at its normal 
work location in 2020 and 2021.304 
This Article does not fully support the Senate proposal because it 
presupposes the pre-pandemic work arrangements when determining 
the source of teleworkers’ incomes. Nonetheless, this Article welcomes 
the concept of a federal solution, even if temporary. Despite the recent 
proposal, negotiations on virus relief have experienced a deadlock in 
Congress, and it is not apparent whether the challenge of taxing 
teleworkers will advance on its own. Further, state tax officials oppose 
the idea of the federal government interfering with their policies and 
regulations, arguing that a state is free to pursue its own fiscal 
policies.305  
This Article argues that to redress the income tax problems of 
teleworkers, Congress is the ideal candidate rather than the judiciary or 
the states. Congress’ decision should clarify to what extent source states 
can tax income from nonresidents, not just during the pandemic but 
also long-term. For the reasons discussed above, this Article proposes a 
residence-based taxation for individual taxpayers with a certain 
threshold. Specifically, it supports the approach taken by the Mobile 
Workforce State Income Tax Simplification Act that establishes a 
uniform threshold where workers could be required to file and 
businesses to withhold tax only after an employee has worked more 
than thirty days in a state.306  
Such a congressional uniform solution may offer the following 
benefits. First, it provides a bright-line rule applicable nationally 
resulting in increased compliance, where tax complexity can reduce 
taxpayer compliance. Currently, taxpayers are perplexed by a bevy of 
conflicting state rules and a lack of guidance. This burdens an 
individual’s ability to pay taxes which in turn reduces both compliance 
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Second, establishing a clear approach to taxation reduces the 
country’s reliance on judicial intervention. Current tax cases are 
complicated and require significant analysis in constitutional gray areas 
searching out potential violations of the Dormant Commerce Clause or 
Due Process Clause. States passing tax laws are subject to expensive and 
lengthy adjudication, reducing the very purpose of the tax — to raise 
revenues.  
Currently, there are various state tax laws preventing these goals. The 
goal of federal law would then not only be the standardization of tax 
law and administration regarding virtual teleworkers, but it also would 
focus on preempting state law that is an obstacle to these goals. 
In the absence of federal legislation, the alternative solution would be 
to allow all fifty states to adopt supporting tax laws individually. This 
alternative is less preferable because many states are not incentivized to 
apply a rule that would reduce their tax revenue (such as New York) 
while at the same time, it would be less efficient and lack consistency 
making it more difficult for individual taxpayers to comply. 
B. Federal Preemption and the States Powers to Tax 
Each state is sovereign and has the ability to establish its own method 
and procedure for tax administration.307 This power has been termed as 
“unlimited,” but only “so far as it has been surrendered to the Federal 
government, either expressly or by necessary implication.”308 In other 
words, “[f]ederal law may preempt state law under the Supremacy 
Clause309 of the Constitution.”310 
Next, the question is whether congressional legislation preempting 
state tax law would be valid and enforceable in the context of the 
taxation of teleworkers. The answer is yes.  
When discussing preemption, the “presumption” when interpreting 
a federal law is that “Congress does not intend to supplant state law.”311 
This presumption may be overcome in three ways. First, state law can 
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be preempted by conflict preemption when Congress “explicitly” 
preempts state law “through explicit statutory language.”312 Second is 
field preemption which is when the federal government “regulates 
conduct in a field” so “pervasive[ly]” that courts will assume “Congress 
left no room for the States to supplement it.”313 Field preemption is 
applied when a state enacts a law in an area the federal government has 
traditionally managed, such as immigration314 or foreign relations.315 
Last, conflict preemption preempts state law when it “conflicts with 
federal law.”316 Conflict preemption can happen either when “it is 
impossible for a private party to comply with both state and federal 
requirements” or when the “state law stands as an obstacle to the 
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of 
Congress.”317 
In the context of taxing teleworkers, because tax law is an area that 
has traditionally been dominated concurrently both by state and federal 
governments, it seems likely that field preemption is unavailable. 
Therefore, Congress’ best path to preempt state tax law and doctrine is 
either by express preemption or conflict preemption supported via the 
Supremacy Clause and Commerce Clause.318 
Some scholarship argues that there should be significant limits on the 
federal government’s power to preempt state tax law.319 Opponents of 
the federal preemption of state tax law point to Alexander Hamilton’s 
statement in the Federalist Papers that a state’s power to tax should 
“retain an independent and uncontrollable authority to raise revenue to 
any extent of which they may need, by every kind of taxation, except 
duties on imports and exports.”320 The scope of those limitations 
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remains uncertain, but one school of thought is that the preemption of 
any non-discriminatory state tax laws would be unconstitutional.321 
Despite some scholars’ argument that state tax law may be uniquely 
resistant to the federal government’s preemption power, this Article 
argues that the federal government retains the power to preempt state 
tax law by standardizing the taxation of teleworkers.322 In discussing 
why Congress likely can preempt state tax law for teleworking, four 
issues that are helpful to discuss briefly. First, the foundational 
constitutional framework that allows the federal government to 
preempt state tax law. Second, an overview of the various constitutional 
powers Congress has relied on to preempt state tax law. Third, the 
federal government’s history of preempting many different forms of 
state tax laws. Last, and most persuasively, the Supreme Court’s recent 
case law on this question directly invites Congress to legislate on this 
specific question. 
First, M’Culloch v. Maryland firmly establishes that federal law may 
preempt state tax law.323 In holding that Maryland’s tax law was 
preempted, the Supreme Court noted that “the states have no power, by 
taxation or otherwise, to retard, impede, burden, or in any manner 
control, the operations of the constitutional laws enacted by congress 
into execution the powers vested in the general government.”324 In 
doing so, the M’Culloch court recognized that the states’ “absolute” 
power to tax remains “subordinate to, and may be controlled by the 
constitution of the United States.”325 
Second, federal law will preempt state law “in any area” where 
Congress has authority.326 In practice, this often happens in areas where 
both the federal and state governments operate, such as tax law.327 Some 
examples of the types of constitutional authority that has been used to 
preempt state tax law include (1) the federal government’s power to 
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regulate Native American reservations,328 (2) Congress’s power to 
interact with other foreign powers,329 (3) federal law that requires a 
state to not apply discriminatory taxes against another state’s residents 
or against federal employees,330 and (4) most importantly, through 
Congress’ authority to regulate interstate commerce.331 Because this 
Article focuses on the multistate taxation of teleworkers working for 
out-of-state employers, the Dormant Commerce Clause seems to be the 
most effective tool to preempt state tax doctrines. 
Third, historically, the federal government has had the freedom to 
preempt most forms of state tax laws.332 Influential portions of the legal 
community support the premise that federal law likely only “lacks the 
power to abolish state-level corporate income taxes,” but otherwise can 
preempt almost all other forms of state tax law, examples including the 
“retirement income of nonresidents, internet access, or interstate 
businesses with limited nexus.”333 
Last but not least, the Supreme Court has repeatedly conceded that 
Congress may step in and regulate state tax law when it relates to 
interstate commerce. In South Dakota v. Wayfair, where the Court 
discussed the intersection of the Dormant Commerce Clause and tax 
law, the majority “conceded that Congress has the authority to change 
the physical presence rule.”334 Importantly, not only has the Supreme 
Court expressly noted that Congress has the ability to standardize the 
rules of state tax and the physical presence of taxpayers, but the Court 
has also consistently upheld federal law that preempts state tax law 
which burdens interstate commerce.335 
For the foregoing reasons, federal law allows the preemption of state 
tax law that stands as an obstacle to the enforcement of residence-based 
taxation for teleworkers’ multistate income. This seems likely to be the 
case in light of the Supreme Court’s express endorsement for Congress 
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to legislate in this area, legal scholarship’s support for the federal 
preemption of state tax laws, and because of the long history of the 
federal preemption of state tax laws under the Dormant Commerce 
Clause as well as through other various congressional powers. Though 
the power of the federal preemption of state tax law is not limitless, 
federal preemption in this area would succeed under a Dormant 
Commerce Clause analysis as a burden on interstate commerce. 
CONCLUSION 
There is no doubt that the risk of double taxation arises when one 
state taxes an individual based on resident status and another taxes this 
same individual based on their source of income. The ideal solution is 
to adopt a uniform measure to relieve double taxation. However, the 
lack of uniformity among the states is allowing some states to exercise 
aggressive source-based taxation on remote workers.  
This problem has been exacerbated in the wake of COVID-19, where 
the majority of Americans now work remotely. Many states have issued 
either no guidance for the taxation of teleworkers’ state income tax or 
have only issued temporary guidance maintaining the pre-pandemic 
situation as the status quo. The interim guidance in effect intrusively 
extends source-based taxation at the cost of residence taxation. This 
raises concerns under the Commerce Clause and Due Process Clause, 
which in turn emphasizes that a state cannot place an undue burden on 
interstate commerce by taxing out of state residents at a higher rate than 
in state residents. 
Congress should act by establishing laws that govern the states’ ability 
to tax cross-border activities. Specifically, Congress should enact a long-
term solution where a source state may only tax a nonresident’s income 
on the days where the taxpayer is physically present for a certain 
number of days (for example, thirty days). This proposal can act as a 
threshold to trigger the compliance obligation and provide that 
teleworking does not count as physical presence in the source state.  
Besides Congressional action, the Supreme Court should have heard 
New Hampshire and decided that extraterritorial source taxation over 
nonresident teleworkers by maintaining the pre-pandemic work 
arrangement, because the status quo violates both the Commerce 
Clause and Due Process Clause. This would have promoted greater 
efficiency among the states and signaled Congress that they should act 
to create clearer guidance for the multistate taxation of teleworkers.  
Both employers and employees will welcome a judicial or 
congressional solution for taxing teleworkers. Obviously, employers 
will expect clear guidance on how to process employees’ individual tax 
  
1226 University of California, Davis [Vol. 55:1149 
documents. However, there is another reason why many businesses pay 
close attention to teleworkers’ individual tax problems. When a 
business has cross-border employees stranded in different taxing 
jurisdictions, this may trigger tax nexus for the business in each 
jurisdiction where a certain number of employees are located. And with 
a tax nexus, these different states may attempt to assess corporate 
income taxes on the business.336 The potential tax competition on such 
businesses is a hidden million-dollar question behind taxing 
teleworkers. That question is beyond the scope of this Article, but will 
be explored in the author’s future projects. 
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